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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Three Essays in Finance
by
Ye Wang
Doctor of Philosophy in Management
University of California, Los Angeles, 2019
Professor Antonio E. Bernardo, Chair
The first chapter of my dissertation explores the roles “quants” or technically trained
workers play at hedge funds. I quantify the impact of hiring “quants” on hedge fund strategy
and risk taking by exploiting H-1B lottery results and a policy shock that significantly
reduced the future supply of foreign high-skilled labor in the U.S. I find that the H-1B visa
program allows hedge funds to pursue strategies that are more quantitative (e.g., hedging,
systematic trading, etc.) as opposed to fundamentals-based (e.g., event driven). Although
there is evidence of substitution between fund strategies, I also find that hedge funds overall
become more diversified, both in terms of regional focus and fund investment style.
Traditional theories on corporate financial policy mostly focus on firm-specific deter-
minants and assume that capital structure choices are made independently of the actions
of peer firms. The second chapter of my dissertation introduces a theoretical model that
embodies the dynamic of how peer behavior affects a firm’s optimal choice of debt level.
Specifically, peer effect is captured by a measure of how much the liquidation value of assets
are adversely impacted if peer firms choose to liquidate simultaneously, the effect of which
is more prominent for industries with highly specialized assets – hence low asset redeploy-
ability. The theoretical model predicts that a firm’s optional debt level is lower when the
liquidation prices of its assets are expected to be more severely impacted by the concurrent
liquidation of peer firms. Moreover, in those situations where peer firms’ cash flows are
more closely correlated, the optional debt level will be higher. Individual firms’ attempts to
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maximize their own utility lead to an industry-wide over leverage, further exacerbating the
risk of general crises in an already highly correlated industry.
The third chapter of my dissertation explores the potential of using deep learning models
to enhance equity trading strategies such as momentum and reversal trading. A deep feed-
forward neural network model (DFN) is fed with a training data set (1965-2000) that uses
the rolling Z-scored cumulative returns of various horizons as predicative variables. With
the model parameters generated by the training set, the model is applied to the validation
set (2000-2016) to generate a signal for each stock predicting its likelihood of outperforming
the cross-sectional medium. Based on this model-predicted signal, I have constructed an
long-short investment portfolio out of the validation data set. The deep learning portfolios
yield an annualized return of over 20 percent and generate significantly large alphas over
commonly used factor models.
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CHAPTER 1
Foreign High-Skilled Labor and Hedge Fund
Performance: Evidence from H-1B Lotteries
How do high-skilled immigrant employees affect the investment strategies of hedge funds?
This paper endeavors to expand on the growing literature that intersects between the fields
of labor economics and investment by exploring the key issue of whether immigrant labor
can contribute to financial firms’ investment strategy beyond the contribution of local la-
bor. Exploring this issue is inherently difficult since labor composition of firms is often
unobservable. Additionally, quantifying the impact of an additional immigrant worker is not
meaningful when foreign labor only constitutes a minuscule portion of a firm’s total employee
headcount. This is especially problematic when analyzing large firms, since they may want
to hire immigrant labor with varying degrees of skill levels suited for different tasks (e.g.,
secretaries vs. engineers). In other words, not all immigrant labor are the same, especially
in large firms.
I overcome these challenges by focusing exclusively on hedge fund firms. This setting
is ideal firstly because hedge fund firms are much smaller in size than mutual fund firms.
Secondly, given its small size, the skill or talent levels of employees at hedge fund firms should
be much closer to being uniform or symmetric. Therefore, the marginal effect of immigrant
labor can be significant as we expect the average intended foreign hire to be highly skilled,
trained, experienced, and specialized. This claim is verifiable by studying the job titles and
highest academic degrees as reported in the U.S. temporary work visa applications filed by
hedge fund firms.
The key outcome of interest in this project is the investment behavior of hedge fund firms.
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Specifically, I explore the changes to a hedge fund firm’s investment style, regional coverage,
and risk behavior resulting from the hiring of high-skilled foreign labor. A central link
under exploration is whether labor diversification would lead to more diversified investment
strategies, both in terms of regional focus and fund investment styles. My null hypothesis
is twofold: first, the hiring of high-skilled foreign labor contributes to the adoption of more
quantitative strategies (e.g., hedging, systematic trading, etc.) as opposed to fundamental-
based strategies (e.g., event driven); Second, the diverse backgrounds of foreign-born labor
brings in broader exposure to different regional markets and therefore contributes to the
diversification of the hedge fund firms’ investment portfolios. Since the U.S. market is more
predisposed to the employment of quantitative investment strategies, the combined effects of
the aforementioned two mechanisms could generate an empirical observation that the hiring
of foreign-born employees in hedge fund firms leads simultaneously to a more intensive focus
on the U.S. market as well as a higher level of overall regional diversification of the investment
portfolio.
The main empirical strategy in establishing a clear link between foreign labor hiring and
hedge fund investment behavior is to exploit random firm-level variation in the supply of
immigrant work visas in the U.S. Specifically, H-1B visas are often distributed by lottery due
to excess demand for them beyond the fixed quota. For example, the number of H-1B visas
available in 2008 was 85,000. The number of H-1B applications, however, exceeded 150,000
on the first day the Department of Homeland Security started accepting applications for the
year. As a result, a lottery was held to randomly distribute H-1B visas in 2008. For every
year, some hedge fund firms will arbitrarily not be able to hire (for the long-term) some of
their intended immigrant labor. I interpret this failure in hiring as an excess demand shock
for foreign skilled labor. Therefore, using this shock, I am able to cleanly test for the causal
links between high-skilled foreign labor and hedge fund investment behavior.
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1.1 Background and Literature
1.1.1 Immigrant Labor in the U.S.
Although the U.S. historically has stood as one of the most accommodating countries with
respect to immigration, the topic has always been controversial due to the inherent avenues
of abuse (e.g., displacement of native workers, suppression of wages, etc.) and risk to national
security (e.g., corporate espionage, terrorism, etc.). Despite arguments for a more restrictive
immigration policy, we have yet to fully understand the role of immigrants in facilitating
economic growth and have only recently begun understanding the value of immigrant labor
from the perspectives of corporations.
U.S. corporations hire most of their immigrant labor through the H-1B visa program.
Firms sponsor their intended foreign-born hires for H-1B visas by filing two key documents:
the Labor Condition Application (LCA), which is submitted to the U.S. Department of
Labor, and the I-129 petition, which is submitted to the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security. In doing so, however, they must provide supporting evidence that hiring them will
not displace native workers. To demonstrate the necessity of hiring a foreign national, the
firm needs to show that the intended foreign hire is uniquely qualified for the job position in
question by his/her educational qualification, experience, and specialty and that an equally
qualified local alternative cannot be found within a fixed period of time.
The empirical evidence on the crowding out effect are mixed. Kerr and Lincoln 2010 and
Peri, Shih, and Sparber 2015, for example, find no evidence of local worker displacement
at the state level and within computer-related firms, respectively. Peri, Shih, and Sparber
2015 suggest that the hiring of native and immigrant labor are in fact complements. Aob-
dia, Srivastava, and Wang 2018, who study the determinants of LCA submissions by large
accounting firms, similarly find that the immigrant hires serve mostly as “gap fillers” and
specialists. Likewise, Mithas and Lucas 2010 show that on average foreign IT professionals
earn more than IT professionals with U.S. citizenship. This finding suggests that U.S. and
foreign IT professionals may, again, be complements (or imperfect substitutes at the very
least). On the other hand, Doran, Gelber, and Isen 2014 find that winning additional H-1B
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visas via lottery in the years 2006 and 2007 led to fewer employment of local workers, lower
employee earnings, and higher firm profits.
Whether immigrant labor actually make contributions beyond that of local labor is also
ambiguous and understudied. Doran, Gelber, and Isen 2014, for example, demonstrate that
additional H-1B visas approved at the firm level has an insignificant effect on patenting and
R&D activity (measured by the use of R&D tax credits). However, this finding is at odds
with the preponderance of evidence of an increasing proportion of innovating activities done
by immigrants. Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle 2010 cite several supporting facts: 25 percent
of founders of public U.S. companies between 1990 and 2005 that received venture capital
financing are immigrants, 25 percent of founders of high-tech companies in 2006 with more
than $1 million in sales are immigrants, and non-U.S. citizens account for 24 percent of all
international patent applications from the U.S. I intend to extend this literature through the
analysis of immigrant labor within hedge fund firms in an attempt to understand their roles
and contributions to portfolio composition and investment strategies.
1.1.2 Labor Diversity and U.S. Corporations
This project contributes to the branch of literature that explores how characteristics of labor
within a firm can influence its strategy and financing decisions. While many recent research
highlight the cost of labor within a firm (e.g., Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin 2015 show increase
in employment protection can crowd out financial leverage), others such as Tate and Yang
2015b, Tate and Yang 2015a, Tate and Yang 2015c, Mueller, Ouimet, and Simintzi 2017,
and Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi 2015 provide empirical evidence that labor diversity, in
terms of skill, gender or ethnicity, for example, can potentially enhance firm value.
Tate and Yang 2015b and Tate and Yang 2015c explore the worker-firm matched data
from the U.S. Census Bureau in order to understand the value of corporate diversification
and its impact on human capital. Tate and Yang 2015b document that workers in diversified
(operating in at least two distinct industries) firms develop a more diverse set of skills
compared to single industry firms. Workers with a broader range of skills afford the firm more
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adaptability: diversified firms can redeploy labor to sectors with higher marginal returns.
As result, firms enjoy higher productivity and lower costs of hiring and firing. Tate and
Yang 2015c find similar benefits in the context of mergers and acquisitions: industry pairs
with higher human capital “transferability” leads to larger productivity gains during cross-
industry acquisitions.
Diversity in labor skill levels, as represented in differential pay scales, has also been shown
to benefit firms. Using a set of firms in the United Kingdom, Mueller, Ouimet, and Simintzi
2017 show that larger relative wage differentials lead to higher valuations, stronger operating
performance, larger equity returns, and greater sensitivity to earnings surprises. As Mueller,
Ouimet, and Simintzi 2017 argue, this increased productivity is the result of higher incentive
provisions.
Lastly, Tate and Yang 2015a and Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi 2015 find evidence
that labor diversity through gender and culture could limit bias in employee compensation
and increase trust between firms, respectively. Tate and Yang 2015a find that the wage
gap between men and women are much smaller under female leadership at plants. Ahern,
Daminelli, and Fracassi 2015 underscores the importance of ethnic culture in cross-border
mergers, as they find that cross-border mergers yield lower combined announcement returns
when target and acquirer have greater cultural distance. This project expands on the benefits
of diversity in labor and corporate culture through the exploration of the role of immigrant
labor in firms.
1.1.3 Regional Diversity and Investment
Past scholarship has explored the connection between investors’ place of origin or residence
and the regional distribution of their investment portfolios. In particular, in both household
and professionally managed portfolios, the home bias puzzle or the observation that investors
often have a bias for local investments, is well documented. These findings, however, does not
necessarily imply the presence of behavioral bias. Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp 2010,
for example, provide a model to show that investors can deviate from a diversified portfolio
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if allowed to collect information first. In other words, permitting information acquisition can
rationalize the emergence of both diversified and concentrated investing strategies.
Many of the empirical findings seem to support the superior information theory (i.e.,
“rational bias” theory), as documented in Coval and Moskowitz 1999, Coval and Moskowitz
2001, Ivkovic and Weisbenner 2005, and Bae, Stulz, and Tan 2008. Coval and Moskowitz
1999 find that U.S. investment managers have a strong preference for firms whose head-
quarters are located nearby. Coval and Moskowitz 2001 extend this finding by showing that
fund managers additionally earn substantial abnormal returns on these nearby investments,
which supports the information advantage theory. Ivkovic and Weisbenner 2005 draw similar
conclusions when analyzing household portfolios, which also exhibit heavy bias towards local
investments. Likewise, these local holdings generate significant higher returns than non-local
holdings, which again suggests superior knowledge on local firms. Lastly, Bae, Stulz, and
Tan 2008 show that an analyst makes more precise earnings forecasts for firms located in
the same country where the analyst is residing.
Besides a ”rational bias” explanation, cultural proximity and familiarity could be the
behavioral factors that lead to home bias. Grinblatt and Keloharju 2001 show that investors
are more inclined to trade Finnish firms that are located closer in proximity, communicate
with them in their native language, and have CEOs of the same cultural background as
they do. Huberman 2001 likewise show that household’s portfolios are concentrated towards
firms that are geographically close or familiar (e.g., employees owning employer’s stock in
their retirement portfolio). However, as found in Grinblatt and Keloharju 2000, home bias
is inversely related to investor sophistication. These set of findings are difficult to reconcile
with just the superior information theory.
Whether the cost of information acquisition or cultural familiarity is the explanatory
factor for home bias, labor diversification stands as a plausible channel to mitigate this bias.
The diverse backgrounds of foreign-born labor could change the corporate culture, style, or
practices of hedge fund firms in a positive way by bringing new perspectives and therefore
new or different investment proposals into consideration. Their language skills and cultural
versatility could serve to reduce the cost of information acquisition. Therefore, one could
6
expect that the hiring of foreign labor in a hedge fund firm should lead to a more regionally
diversified investment portfolio.
On the other hand, since foreign employees recruited through H1-B visas in the invest-
ment industry tend to be more highly trained in quantitative methods, we can also expect
more quantitative-based investment strategies at those firms that depend on foreign labor.
Given that quantitative strategies are more easily applicable to the U.S. market, another
plausible outcome is that the hiring of high-skilled foreign labor leads to a more U.S.-focused
investment portfolio, which would be the direct opposite of “home bias.”
1.2 The H-1B Program and Data Processing
More than million immigrants enter the United States every year. Most have significantly
lower skills than native workers, but a narrow category of highly-skilled immigrants have
played an important role in the technological advances achieved by the corporate sector
and in the research produced by academic institutions. The regulation concerning their
employment by U.S. corporations is linked to the H-1B temporary visa program that has
remained practically unchanged since 1990, despite dramatic changes in the U.S. business
and economic environment. H1-B is a short-term work visa issued to employers to hire pro-
fessional in specialty occupations that require at least a bachelor’s degree and the theoretical
and practical application of highly specialized knowledge and skills. It is valid for an initial
period of three years and can be renewed once, for a total of six years.
Since the the advent of the H-1B program in 1990, it has been subject to an annual quota
on new visa issuance. The initial quota capped the annual new assurances of H-1B visas at
65,000, which was not surpassed until 1997. The period from 1999 to 2003 saw a temporary
relaxation of the quota: the cap was increased to 115,000 for 1999 and 2000 and further to
195,000 for 2001 through 2003. However, in 2004, the cap was drastically reduced back to
65,000. In addition,the H-1B Visa Reform Act of 2004 allowed for an additional 20,000 visas
each year reserved for foreigners who hold a master’s degree or above from an American
institution of higher education. Moreover, since 2000 U.S. higher education and non-profit
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institutions wishing to hire foreign skilled workers were exempt from H-1B limits, creating an
open pathway for foreign masters and Ph.D. students to find academic and research-based
employment. Still, the overall quota pales in comparison with the number of foreigners
receiving advanced degrees in the U.S., which increased to 380,000 by 2016. The quota is
filled on a first-come, first served basis beginning on April 1 of the prior fiscal year. Since
2004, the H-1B quota has been reached within a few days to a few months of the opening
date.
Several steps are required for a foreign national to acquire an H-1B visa. The very first
step is to find a U.S.-based employee that is willing to sponsor his/her visa application.
For information on hedge fund firms, I have obtained the Hedge Fund Research (HFR)
Assets/Performance Data, which includes around 1.8 million reports on hedge funds from
1998 to 2017. By restricting the sample to U.S.-based hedge funds for which regular monthly
reports are available, the sample size is reduced to 780,000. Each report contains information
on the hedge fund’s address, investment strategies, leverage, assets, regional investment
distribution, and performance.
A firm willing to hire a foreign-born specialty worker must first file an LCA with the
Department of Labor. The LCA document outlines the nature of the job and attest that the
firm will comply with H-1B regulations. The form includes information on the prevailing
wage of the occupation, the wage to be paid to the prospective worker, and the address of the
work site. Since the visa is temporary in nature, the LCA must also provide the beginning
and end dates of the position. It’s worth mentioning that a firm might file for a single or
multiple potential hires in the same LCA form and that personal information of the employee
(e.g. name, country of origin, age, sex, previous visa status) is not revealed in the LCAs. I
have obtained the LCAs for H-1B visas from the U.S. Department of Labor, which include
roughly 7 million records from 2001-2017. From these, those filings that are not certified or
do not have valid employment start dates or decision dates are deleted, leaving 6.37 million
entries. Based on firm name and address information, I matched the HFR data with the
LCA data, generating a sample of 10,844 matched LCA records filed by hedge fund firms.
A prospective foreign employee’s application for an H-1B visa is submitted in a I-129 form
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to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, which must be accompanied by an approved
LCA. Therefore, while the visa belongs to an employee (not the firm), a person can only
obtain a new H-1B visa when his/her employer has obtained LCA approval (there is no cap
on LCA approvals).
I-129 applications are accepted beginning on April 1, six months prior to the October 1
start of the federal fiscal year, and throughout the fiscal year. Since H-1B processing works
on a first-come, first-served basis, given the acute scarcity of the annual quota, applicants try
to submit their cap-subjective I-129 applications on or shortly after April 1. For example, the
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in the Department of Homeland Security
already received 119,193 cap-subject H-1B applications by April 3,2007 and approximately
163,000 petitions in the first week of April 2008. USCIS randomly selected visas for process-
ing until the 65,000 available quotas are all allocated. The unselected visa applications are
not processed and returned. This lottery process induces a rationing of the supply of foreign
skilled workers that is both significant in scale and randomly distributed among applicants.
Firms submitting LCAs clearly have vacancies in specific occupations that they hope to fill
with foreign skilled labor, but the lottery generates a randomly distributed negative shock
to their supply.
I have obtained a total of roughly 5.5 million processed H-1B I-129 applications spanning
from 1996 to 2016 from the U.S. Department of Labor. Each I-129 record contains the
receipt date of the petition, employer’s name and address, compensation, job code, job
definition, and some personal information of the applicant, such as country of birth, country
of citizenship, current visa class, field of study, etc. It also contains a series of questions
that help identify the nature of the filing (e.g. new petition, revised previous petition).
I first deleted all the filings that were meant to correct errors in a previous submission.
Then, matching the remaining records with the HFR data based on firm name and address
information, I got a sample of 7,791 processed I-129 applications from prospective foreign
employees at hedge fund firms.
Notice that this sample includes three types of applications: 1) processed cap-dependent
applications (these are the applications that have passed through the lotteries); 2) processed
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cap-exempt applications; 3) processed applications for extensions of existing H-1B status. For
an example of the second category, the processed I-129 applications from foreigners who hold
advanced degrees and are to be employed in higher education or non-profit institutions are
included in this sample, while these applications are not subject to the annual quota placed on
new H-1B visas. The empirical specification of this study, which will be discussed in the next
section, requires the processed cap-dependent I-129 applications (I129 CAP ) be separated
from the other two categories of cap-exempt and extension applications (I129 Other).
Applications for extensions are easily identifiable from a question in the form. The com-
plicating matter is that the form does not always clearly indicate whether a new application
is cap-subjective or cap-exempt. Specifically, older versions of the I-129 form, the last one
being the revision of March 11, 2009, did not include a question on whether the application
is cap-subjective or cap-exempt. A new version of the form introduced on November 23,
2010 and, for that matter, all subsequent versions include a required question that asks the
applicant to specify the type of H-1B petition being filed by selecting from four options,
three of which are cap-subjective (“cap H-1B bachelors’ degree,” “cap H-1B masters’ degree
or higher,” and “cap H-1B1 Chile/Singapore”) and the other one is “cap exempt.” There-
fore, for all the I-129 applications filed since 2011, I can reply on answers to this question to
determine their cap status. For older applications, I can only rely on the information on the
individual characteristics of the applicant to determine whether he/she would count toward
the H-1B quota.
For older applications that didn’t include the self-identification question on filing type,
I have employed the following criteria to approximately arrive at a sub-sample of cap-
subjective I-129s, with the cap-exempt and extension applications in its complement. First,
given that the processing of cap-subjective H-1B visas is first-come first-served and the
scarcity of the quota, I assume that prospective cap-dependent employees would file I-129
petitions within a short span of time after April 1 to be eligible for working in the U.S.
from the next fiscal year (from October 1). Based on this assumption I have filtered out
all the I-129 applications other than those filed in April, May, and June. Second, since
cap-dependent applicants are applying for H-1B visas for the next fiscal year, the start date
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of their jobs cannot be before October 1; while a cap-exempt applicant may very well have
the leisure of belatedly submitting an I-129 in May to start a job in the August of the same
fiscal year. Based on this differentiation, I have further filtered the remaining sample by
requiring that the stated job start date should be later than October 1. Third, based on
their answers to certain questions in the I-129 form, I have filtered out those applicants who
are to be employed at institutions of higher education, government research organizations,
or non-profit organizations. Fourth, the checks of certain boxes in the I-129 form, such as
checking ”new employment” for the question on the basis of classification (part 2, question
2), are necessary (but not sufficient) indicators for cap-dependent applications. Those forms
that contain responses other than such specifications are filtered out. Following such mea-
sures, the remaining records in the sample are assumed to represent processed cap-dependent
I-129 applications (I129 CAP ), while its complement set should include both cap-exempt
applications and applications for extensions (I129 Other).
1.3 Empirical Strategies
1.3.1 Q1: Does Immigrant Hiring Affect Hedge Fund Firm Investment Behav-
ior?
Our primary specification relies on the assumption that some hedge fund firms are randomly
unable to hire foreign-born labor almost every year due to aggregate demand for H-1B
visas exceeding the capped supply. Hedge fund firms essentially have to compete with large
corporations that have the resources to hire large amounts of foreign labor every year. This
compounds the difficulty of acquiring H-1B visas for hedge fund firms. Therefore, being
able to hire or keep a foreign-born candidate employee is much more meaningful for hedge
fund firms. However, we cannot use the total number of received H-1B visas outright as
an exogenous variable, as it depends on the number of submitted H-1B visa applications,
which is endogenous. Instead, I take advantage of the lottery of cap-subjective petitions as
a random exogenous shock to a firm’s foreign labor supply.
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A firm that plans to sponsor an H-1B visa for an intended foreign hire needs to file
the Labor Condition Application (LCA) to the U.S. Department of Labor. Hence the total
number of LCAs filed by a firm indicates its expected foreign labor demand. I define LCAit
as the total number of LCAs for H-1B visas filed by firm i in year t; of these, LCA CAPit
is the number of LCAs that correspond to cap-subjective H-1B visa applications. On the
supply side, the total number of approved I-129 petitions indicates the actual number of H-
1B visas acquired by a firm. Similarly, I define I129it as the total number of approved I-129
petitions obtained by firm i in year t, and of these, I129 CAPit is the number of approved
cap-subjective I-129 petitions.
Because of the random lottery, an exogenous measure of a hedge fund firm’s employment
of foreign labor can be defined as the fraction of satisfied foreign labor demand out of the
total lottery-capped LCAs, which is defined as:
MDit ≡ I129 CAPit
LCA CAPit
(1.1)
The previous section has detailed how I have separated the sample of processed I-129
applications into a sub-sample of cap-subjective applications (I129 CAP ) and another sub-
sample of cap-exempt and extension applications (I129 Other). To estimate LCA CAP , I
made the following assumption. Because there is no quota placed on new cap-exempt I-129
petitions or applications for extensions, it is reasonable to assume that in such categories,
there should be a one-on-one correspondence between the LCA sample and the processed
I-129 sample. It is in the category of the cap-dependent petitions that we might see an LCA
in the sample but could not find a corresponding processed I-129, because this I-129 petition
did not pass through the lottery and hence did not end up in the processed I-129 sample.
Based on this assumption, LCA CAPit should equal to LCAit minus I129 Otherit.
The baseline regression model estimates the effect of marginal changes in MDit on several
outcome measures of the hedge fund firms’ investment behavior and performance:
yit ≡ αt + λ1D CAPit−1 + λ2MDit−1 + γ′Cit + it (1.2)
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yit is a measure of hedge fund firm investment style or performance, αt is the year fixed
effect, Cit is a vector of control variables for firm characteristics (e.g., age, size, location, etc.),
and it is the error term. D CAPit is a dummy variable that equals 1 if firm i has submitted
any H1-B LCAs that are subject to the lottery cap in year t (i.e. LCA CAPit > 0). A
statistically significant λ2 would support the proposed channel of impact.
The main outcomes of interest are the hedge fund firms’ investment style and diversifi-
cation:
1. Investment strategy style: I define two major investment styles: “quantitative” vis-
a-vis “fundamental.” Based on hedge funds’ self-reported investment strategies and
sub-strategies, I count the strategies of “equity market neutral,” “quantitative direc-
tional,” “active trading,” “commodity-multi,” “currency-systematic,” and “systematic
diversified” as quantitative investment style as they require highly sophisticated quan-
titative analysis. I count the strategies of “event-driven,” “fundamental growth,” and
“fundamental value” as fundamental investment style as they rely on fundamental
analysis.
2. Diversification: a hedge fund firm’s diversification in terms of investment region (e.g.
U.S., Asia, Africa, etc.) and strategy (e.g. macro, equity hedge, event-driven, etc.) is
measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of its constituent funds in that
respect.
1.3.2 Q2: Does Dependence on Immigrant Labor Affect Investment Strategy?
Evidence From the H-1B Visa Reform Act of 2004
An alternative method to quantifying the impact of high-skilled immigrant labor on hedge
fund investment is to compare hedge fund firms that relied on immigrant labor to those that
did not around the time of a U.S. policy change that decreased the H-1B work visa supply
cap. The H-1B Visa Reform Act of 2004 reduced the number of H-1B visa supply from
195,000 to 85,000 in 2005. I would evaluate investment style differences between these two
types of hedge fund firms using the following difference-in-differences specification:
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yit = αi + αt + τ(Postt × Foreigni) + γ′Cit + it (1.3)
where αi and αt are firm and calendar-year fixed effects, yit is a measure of investment
style (e.g., the count or percentage of quantitative-style funds in a firm), Postt is a dummy
variable that equals to 1 if t is greater than the year 2004 and 0 otherwise, Foreigni is a
dummy variable that equals to 1 if the hedge fund firm has previously hired immigrant labor
(i.e., hired foreign worker that received H-1B visas) in the year 2005 and 0 otherwise, and
Cit is a vector of control variables for hedge fund firm characteristics. τ is the difference-in-
differences estimator that measures the sensitivity of hedge fund firm investment style with
respect to being dependent on the H-1B visa system.
For example, with respect to the percentage of quantitative-style funds within a hedge
fund firm, a τ < 0 suggests that a negative supply shock of immigrant labor has an adverse
effect on the adoption of quantitative investment strategies. This finding would imply that
immigrant labor enhances the technical sophistication of hedge fund firms beyond local labor.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Summary Statistics
Table 1.1 reports the number of unique firms that show up in the whole HFR sample in
any given year and the number of firms that filed any LCA petition in that year. While the
total number of hedge fund firms has varied between 1201 and 1944, the percentage of firms
that demanded foreign labor in any given year varied between 6 to 12 percent. As expected,
the total number of hedge fund firms as well as the number and percentage of firms that
filed LCAs all reached the highest point in 2007 or 2008; thereafter, the percentage of hedge
fund firms that filed LCAs fluctuated between 9 to 11 percent. Table 1.2 shows similar
variables by state. Hedge fund firms that demand foreign labor are concentrated in New
York, California, Connecticut, Illinois, and Massachusetts.
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[Place table 1.1 and 1.2 about here]
Table 1.3 and 1.4 shows the summary characteristics of firms that have or have not ever
filed LCA petition respectively. In my sample, there are 831 hedge fund firms that have
filed a LCA at least once during the sample period and 3,059 firms that have never filed any
LCAs. Those firms that have had demand for foreign labor are on average 4 years older and
more likely to be located in New York; their managed asset pool is on average eight times
bigger.
[Place table 1.3 and 1.4 about here]
Table 1.5 further delineates the correlations between a firm’s demand for foreign labor in
any given year and a list of firm characteristics, including firm age, asset under management,
leverage, the number of constituent funds that specialize in quantitative or fundamental
investment strategies. Column 1 shows the result of the Probit model. It seems that younger
firms are more likely to file LCAs. One possible explanation is that older firms have enough
immigrant labors that they acquired in earlier years. The probability of filing LCAs is
positively correlated with a firm’s asset under management (AUM), leverage, and the number
of funds using quantitative strategies. More heavily leveraged funds tend to deploy more
complicated algorithmic strategies, generating higher demand for skilled labor. The same
goes for quantitative hedge funds. Since Greene 2004 shows that the maximum likelihood
estimator in Probit model with too many fixed effects has a persistence bias, I have also
reported the results from a direct ordinary least square (OLS) estimation with the same
dependent dummy variable in column 2 and with the logarithm of the number of LCA-
backed workers as the dependent variable in column 3. The results are consistent.
[Place table 1.5 about here]
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1.4.2 How Does Immigrant Hiring Affect Hedge Funds?
I take advantage of the random lottery of cap-dependent H-1B visa petitions to examine
the causal effect of hiring more immigrant labor on a hedge fund firm’s investment behav-
ior. First, Table 1.6 demonstrates that the constructed variable MDit, which represent the
percentage of a firm’s satisfied cap-subjective foreign labor demand, is indeed an exogenous
shock to its foreign labor supply. The table shows the correlations between a set of firm
characteristics and the number of cap-subjective H-1B visas granted to a firm’s prospec-
tive employees in any given year, i.e. the satisfied portion of the firm’s demand for foreign
labor. The result shows that the issuance of cap-dependent visa is indeed very random.
The number of capped visas received by a firm is only strongly correlated with the number
of filed LCAs – buying more lottery tickets, more chances to win. Other visible traits of
the firm demonstrate no correlation with the number of received cap-dependent H-1B visas.
Column 2 shows the results when the dependent variable is changed to MDit. Again, it is
not predictable by any firm characteristics. It supports my premise that MDit represents an
exogenous, random supply shock to a firm’s demand for foreign labor.
[Place table 1.6 about here]
Using MDit as the main independent variable, the following three tables demonstrate
the impact of foreign labor hiring on hedge fund firms’ investment style (Table 1.7), regional
diversification (Table 1.8), and strategy diversification (Table 1.9). They are all based on
post-2008 data, when the lotteries of H1-B visas became regularized and highly restrictive.
Table 1.7 reports the one-year forward effect of MDit on the number of quantitative funds
and fundamental funds within a hedge fund firm. Quantitative funds are defined based on the
hedge funds strategies. These are funds that employ sophisticated quantitative techniques of
analyzing price data to ascertain information about future price movement and relationships
between securities to make selections for purchase and sale. Data is collapsed at the firm-year
level. On average, firms whose demand for capped H-1B labors is fully satisfied will have
ten percent more funds with quantitative strategies than those funds whose demand is not
met at all. Also, firms with fully satisfied cap-dependent foreign labor demand are 6 percent
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more likely to contain at least one fund that utilizes quantitative strategies than those whose
demand for cap-subjective foreign labor is not met at all. These findings support the claim
that hiring high-skilled foreign labor will cause the firm to implement more quantitative
strategies.
Columns 4, 5, and 6 in Table 1.7 show the effect of hiring foreign immigrant labor on the
number of fundamental funds within a firm. Fundamental funds are defined based on the
strategies they deploy, which mostly focus on identifying attractive opportunities through
the analysis of fundamental value and growth potential and responding to significant events.
Column 5 shows that on average firms with their capped H-1B labor demand fully satisfied
will have seven percent fewer funds using fundamental strategies, comparing to firms whose
capped H-1B demand are not met at all. Column 6 shows that firms whose capped H-1B
labor demand are fully met will allocate eight percent less of their asset to be invested by
fundamental strategies, comparing to firms whose capped H-1B demand are not met at all.
Here my assumption is that funds that utilize fundamental strategies are less technically
sophisticated and therefore have less use for skilled labor. Based on this assumption, these
results further verify that extra supply of foreign skilled labor within a firm will result in
higher number of funds that require higher skills.
[Place table 1.7 about here]
Table 1.8 reports the impact of foreign labor supply on the regional diversification of a
hedge fund firm’s investments. Here I use Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure
regional diversification. Specifically, the HHI of a firm’s regional diversification is calculated
in the following way. Each of the firm’s constituent funds has a reported regional focus
of investment, which I have grouped into five big regions of “Asia,” “Europe,” “America,”
“Africa,” and “Others.” The HHI is calculated as the sum of squared asset weight under
each region. For example, suppose that within in a firm, those funds that report “America”
as their regional investment focus collectively manage 80 percent of the firm’s total asset,
those that report “Europe” manage 10 percent, and those that report “Asia” take up the
remaining 10 percent. The HHI of this firm’s regional diversification would be 0.66 ((0.8)2 +
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(0.1)2 + (0.1)2). A higher HHI would indicate lower diversification level.
The HHI of regional diversification is the dependent variable in Column 1. Extra supply
of foreign labor will lead to a significant decrease in the HHI indicator, namely, a higher level
of regional diversification in the firm’s investments. Specifically, a firm whose demand for
cap-dependent foreign labor is not met at all will have an HHI higher by 0.032 than a firm
whose demand for cap-dependent foreign labor is fully satisfied. Column 2 provides the result
of a robustness check by using the logarithm of the number of unique investment regions
within a firm as the dependent variable and shows similar causal relations. As demonstrated
in column 3, the increase in regional diversification in response to extra foreign labor supply
is not because of an increase in the number of funds in this firm, but because of existing
funds’ incorporation of more investment regions.
[Place table 1.8 about here]
Table 1.9 reports the impact of foreign labor supply on a hedge fund firm’s strategy diver-
sification. A firm’s strategy diversification is also measured by an HHI, which is calculated as
the sum of squared asset weight of each unique main strategy as reported by its constituent
funds. There are seven possible main strategies. For example, suppose that within a firm,
those funds that report “equity hedge” as their main investment strategy collectively manage
50 percent of the firm’s total asset, those that report “event driven” manage 30 percent, and
those that report “relative value” manage the remaining 20 percent. The HHI of this firm’s
main strategy diversification would be 0.38 ((0.5)2 + (0.3)2 + (0.2)2). Again, a higher HHI
would indicate lower diversification level, and vice versa.
The HHI of main strategy diversification is the dependent variable in column 1. Extra
supply of foreign labor will lead to a significant decrease in the HHI indicator, which in this
case means a higher level of main strategy diversification in the firm’s funds. Specifically,
a firm whose demand for cap-dependent foreign labor is not met at all will have an HHI
higher by 0.045 than a firm whose demand for cap-dependent foreign labor is fully satisfied.
As robustness checks, column 2 and 3 report the results when the dependent variable is
the logarithm of the number of unique main strategies or the logarithm of the number of
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unique sub-strategies as reported by a firm’s funds. The results are consistent. A firm whose
demand for cap-dependent foreign labor is fully satisfied will have 5 percent more unique
main strategies and 8 percent more unique sub-strategies than a firm whose demand for cap-
dependent foreign labor is not met at all. Here again, column 4 shows that the increase in
strategy diversification in response to extra foreign labor supply is not because of an increase
in the number of funds in the firm, but because of existing funds’ adoption of more diverse
main and sub-strategies.
[Place table 1.9 about here]
Up to this point, I have taken advantage of the external shock to firms’ foreign labor
supply generated by the random H-1B visa lotteries and demonstrated that hiring foreign
skilled labor will cause a hedge fund firm to adopt more quantitative investment styles and
diversify its regional investment focus and strategies. The following section shows the result
from another empirical strategy, where I exploit a sudden U.S. policy change in 2004 to
quantify the impact of high-skilled immigrant labor on hedge fund investment behavior.
1.4.3 H-1B Reform in 2004
The H-1B Visa Reform Act of 2004 suddenly reduced the annual quota of new H-1B visa
issuance from 195,000 to 85,000 in 2005. This policy change provides an opportunity to
examine how the sudden restriction on H-1B visas might have had differential impacts on
hedge fund firms that had demanded foreign labor previously and those that had never
demanded foreign labor. The data sample includes all hedge fund firms from 2001 to 2006
and is collapsed on the firm-year level. Firms in the treatment group are those that had filed
an LCA at least once before 2004.
Table 1.10 reports the difference in difference regression based on the H-1B visa reform in
2004. The outcome variable of interest is the investment style of the hedge fund firms. I first
look at the number fundamental or quantitative funds within a firm. Column 4 shows that
compared to the control group, treated firms saw 2 percent more increase in their number of
fundamental funds from 2003 to 2004. The difference increases to 2.4 percent with two-year
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accumulated effect (from 2003 to 2005) and 3.2 percent with three-year accumulated effect
(from 2003 to 2006). If I replace the number of fundamental funds with its percentage or
asset-weighted percentage as the dependent variable, the results are similar (column 5 and
6). Table 1.11 confirms these results. The interacted term of treatment and post-2004 is
positively related to the increase in the number and percentage of fundamental funds within
in a firm. This shows that the H-1B reform did have an impact on hedge fund strategy
deployment. Because of the post-2004 restriction on the supply of high-skilled foreign labor,
hedge fund firms relatively shifted more to fundamental strategies. Firms that had hired
foreign labor before 2004 were more impacted by the sudden policy restriction and saw a
greater increase in the use of fundamental strategies in the years immediately after the policy
shift.
In both Table 1.10 and 1.11, the differential impact on the number of quantitative funds
between controlled and treated firms is not significant. In fact, for both the treated and con-
trolled groups, there is no significant difference in the number of quantitative funds before
and after the 2004 shock. While firms that might have wanted to expand their quantitative
sections through hiring high-skilled foreign labor were no longer able to do so as quickly as
they had wished as a result of the restriction of the issuance of new H-1B visas, maintaining
existing foreign labor would not be affected by the policy exchange. Moreover, the controlled
firms are likely to be less ambitious about the adoption of quantitative investment strate-
gies to begin with. The lack of significant difference in difference effect for the number of
quantitative funds is therefore understandable.
[Place table 1.10 about here]
[Place table 1.11 about here]
1.5 Conclusion
By exploiting the exogenous impact of random H-1B lotteries on foreign labor supply, I
have examined the role played by technically trained foreign-born employees at hedge fund
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firms. The H-1B visa program allows hedge fund firms to hire from a larger pool of ade-
quately trained “quants” to pursue more quantitative investment strategies as opposed to
fundamental-based strategies. Labor diversification, as resulted from the hiring of foreign-
born labor, also leads to more diversified investment regions and strategies. In other words,
the two traits of H-1B visa holders, namely highly specialized skills and diverse background,
both contributed to changes in hedge fund investment behavior towards a more technical
and more diverse direction.
These results are also confirmed by a difference-in-difference study that quantifies how
a 2004 policy shock that significantly reduced the supply of H-1B visas affected hedge fund
firms that had developed a dependence on the H-1B program for foreign labor supply more
than it impacted firms that had never hired any foreigners. With the tightened restriction
on the issuance of new H-1B visas, hedge fund firms responded by shifting toward more
fundamental strategies – this impact was more visible for those firms that had already
developed a demand for foreign labor through the H-1B program.
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A Summary Statistics
Year No. of Firms
No. of Firms
Filed LCAs
Aggregate Fraction
of Foreign Labor Demand Met
2001 1201 76 1.00
2002 1349 94 0.00
2003 1481 122 0.33
2004 1644 166 0.00
2005 1803 182 0.30
2006 1896 198 0.32
2007 1913 220 0.53
2008 1944 211 0.57
2009 1846 189 0.39
2010 1811 160 0.60
2011 1769 181 0.38
2012 1747 170 0.14
2013 1690 161 0.75
2014 1627 173 0.68
2015 1547 172 0.51
2016 1414 158 0.51
Table 1.1: Number of Hedge Fund Firms by Year
No. of firm is defined as the number of unique firms reported in HFR in a specific year. No. of firms filed
LCAs is defined as the number of unique firms in HFR that filed LCA petition in that year. Aggregate
fraction of foreign labor demand met is defined as the total number of H1-B lottery winners among firms in
HFR divided by total number of H1-B lottery applications among firms in HFR in that year.
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State No. of Firms
No. of Firms
Filed LCAs
Aggregate Fraction
of Foreign Labor Demand Met
NY 1179 382 0.45
CA 496 103 0.33
IL 231 43 0.43
CT 229 73 0.59
TX 170 17 —
FL 158 37 0.00
MA 157 43 0.81
NJ 136 24 1.00
PA 93 13 0.25
CO 57 6 —
VA 50 12 1.00
GA 46 7 —
NC 42 6 0.00
MN 38 9 1.00
WA 34 3 0.00
MD 30 7 0.50
TN 30 6 —
OH 21 2 —
WI 16 1 —
NV 16 3 —
OR 15 2 —
DC 14 6 0.00
MO 12 1 —
AZ 12 1 —
KS 10 2 —
UT 10 1 —
KY 7 1 —
NM 5 1 —
HI 5 1 1.00
RI 5 1 1.00
WY 4 1 —
IA 4 2 —
AK 1 1 1.00
Table 1.2: Number of Hedge Fund Firms by Headquarter State
No. of firm is defined as the number of unique firms reported in HFR in a specific state. No. of firms filed
LCAs is defined as the number of unique firms in HFR that filed LCA petition in that state. Aggregate
fraction of foreign labor demand met is defined as the total number of H1-B lottery winners among firms in
HFR divided by total number of H1-B lottery applications among firms in HFR in that state.
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Table 1.5: Determinants of LCA Filings
(1) (2) (3)
File
H-1B LCA
Probit
File
H-1B LCA
OLS
ln(No.
LCA
Workers)
OLS
ln(Firm Age) −0.017∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗
(−2.28) (−3.69) (−3.25)
ln(Asset Under Management) 0.040∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗
(17.77) (16.01) (10.26)
% Leverage 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(3.28) (3.39) (3.59)
% Fund in Quant 0.044∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗
(4.01) (4.01) (3.56)
% Fund in Fundamentals −0.013 −0.020∗ −0.038∗∗
(−1.20) (−1.65) (−2.34)
Observations 23,626 24,850 24,850
Adj. R2 0.178 0.111 0.107
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Inception Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively. T-statistics are in parentheses.
Standard errors are clustered at the hedge fund level. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the
dummy variable that indicates if a firm files for LCAs in that specific year. The dependent variable in 3 is
the number of workers a firm filed for a specific year. Ln(Firm Age) is defined as logarithm of firm’s age.
Ln(Asset Under Management) is defined as the logarithm of the sum of assets of funds within that firm. %
Leverage is the percentage of funds that is levered, weighted by assets. % Fund in quant is the percentage
of funds that is quantitative, weighted by assets. % Fund in fundamentals is the percentage of funds that is
fundamental, weighted by assets. Reported F statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic.
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Table 1.6: Determinants of Capped H-1B Visa Issuance
(1) (2)
No. Cap
Visa
Granted
%H-1B
Demand Met
ln(LCA Cap Demand) 0.225∗∗∗
(4.70)
ln(Firm Age) −0.028 −0.036
(−1.16) (−1.61)
ln(Asset Under Management) 0.005 −0.004
(0.93) (−1.03)
% Leverage 0.019 −0.009
(1.30) (−0.53)
% Fund in Quant 0.022 0.002
(0.96) (0.10)
% Fund in Fundamentals −0.065∗∗∗ −0.053∗
(−4.04) (−1.95)
Observations 2,316 2,316
Adj. R2 0.172 0.062
State FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Inception Year FE Yes Yes
Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively. T-statistics are in parentheses.
Standard errors are clustered at the hedge fund level. The dependent variable in columns 1 is the number of
capped visa granted, I129 CAP , as defined before. The dependent variable in 2 is the number of capped visa
granted, scaled by the number of capped LCA filed for a specific year, MD. Ln(LCA cap demand)is defined
as the number of capped LCA filed for a specfic year LCA CAP . Ln(Firm Age) is defined as logarithm of
firm’s age. Ln(Asset Under Management) is defined as the logarithm of the sum of assets of funds within
that firm. % Leverage is the percentage of funds that is levered, weighted by assets. % Fund in quant is
the percentage of funds that is quantitative, weighted by assets. % Fund in fundamentals is the percentage
of funds that is fundamental, weighted by assets. Reported F statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F
statistic.
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Table 1.8: Fraction of foreign high-skilled foreign labor demand met and fund strategy
diversification
(1) (2) (3)
Region HHI
ln(No. Unique
Investment Regions)
ln(Overall
Fund Count)
% H-1B Demand Met −0.032∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.077
(−2.59) (2.01) (1.62)
Filed Capped H-1B LCA −0.039∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗
(−3.33) (5.49) (5.46)
ln(Firm Age) 0.002 0.004 0.005
(0.56) (0.74) (0.39)
ln(Total Firm Assets) −0.008∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗
(−7.41) (8.87) (16.33)
Observations 15,128 16,688 16,688
Adj. R2 0.089 0.168 0.340
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Inception Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively. T-statistics are in parentheses.
Standard errors are clustered at the hedge fund level. The dependent variable in column 1 is the HHI of
investment region, weighted by assets. The dependent variable in column 2 is the logarithm of the number
of unique investment regions within a firm. The dependent variable in column 3 is the logarithm of the
total number of funds within a firm. % H-1B demand met is the number of capped visa granted, scaled by
the number of capped LCA filed for a specific year, MD. Filed capped H-1B LCA is the dummy variable
indicates if a firm filed capped LCA for that year DLCA, as defined before. Ln(Firm Age) is defined as the
logarithm of the firm’s age. Ln(Asset Under Management) is defined as the logarithm of the sum of assets
of funds within that firm. Reported F statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic.
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Table 1.9: Fraction of foreign high-skilled foreign labor demand met and fund region focus
diversification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Main Strategy HHI
ln(No. Unique
Main Strategies)
ln(No. Unique
Sub-Strategies)
ln(Overall
Fund Count)
% H-1B Demand Met −0.045∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.077
(−3.12) (2.62) (3.04) (1.62)
Filed Capped H-1B LCA −0.073∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗
(−4.89) (6.18) (6.41) (5.46)
ln(Firm Age) −0.000 0.003 0.008 0.005
(−0.02) (0.79) (1.17) (0.39)
ln(Total Firm Assets) −0.010∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗
(−7.16) (8.80) (11.18) (16.33)
Observations 15,128 16,688 16,688 16,688
Adj. R2 0.102 0.159 0.221 0.340
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Inception Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively. T-statistics are in parentheses.
Standard errors are clustered at the hedge fund level. The dependent variable in column 1 is the HHI of main
investment strategy, weighted by assets. The dependent variable in column 2 is the logarithm of the number
of unique investment main strategies within a firm. The dependent variable in column 3 is the logarithm of
the number of unique investment sub strategies within a firm. The dependent variable in column 4 is the
logarithm of the total number of funds within a firm. % H-1B demand met is the number of capped visa
granted, scaled by the number of capped LCA filed for a specific year, MD. Filed capped H-1B LCA is the
dummy variable indicates if a firm filed capped LCA for that year DLCA, as defined before. Ln(Firm Age)
is defined as logarithm of firm’s age. Ln(Asset Under Management) is defined as the logarithm of the sum
of assets of funds within that firm. Reported F statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic.
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CHAPTER 2
Peer Effects on Firm-Level Strategic Debt Choices: A
Theoretical Model
Modigliani and Miller 1958 built the foundation of theories on corporate capital structure.
In that paper the authors argued that in complete markets a firm’s capital structure does
not affect its value. Robichek and Myers 1966 introduced the trade-off theory by accounting
for the existence of bankruptcy cost, along with corporate taxes. Firms would choose a
leverage level to balance the marginal tax benefit and the marginal bankruptcy cost of
raising debt. Jensen and Meckling 1976 then proposed a model with agency problems,
and concluded with the pecking order theory which ranked the cost of financing by cash,
debt and equity as ascending. Myers 1977 suggested that issuing risky debt reduces the
present market value of a firm that holds real options by inducing a sub-optimal investment
strategy or by forcing the firm and its creditors to bear the costs of avoiding the sub-
optimal strategy. Overall, most theories on corporate capital structure predict that a firm’s
optimal debt choices are influenced by firm-specific determinants such as its marginal tax
rate, asset illiquidity, incentive structure, information environment, and other industry- or
economy-wide determinants. However, a firm’s debt choice is often assumed to be made
independently of the choices of their peers.
Recent empirical research has begun to explore the role of peer firm behavior in affecting
capital structures. Industry average leverage ratios are found be to an important determinant
of firms’ capital structures (Welch 2004, MacKay and Phillips 2005, and Frank and Goyal
2009). Leary and Roberts 2014 find that firms’ capital structures are responsive to peer
firms’ idiosyncratic equity shocks, which are used as exogenous indicators of changes in peer
firm financial choices. The action channel of peer effects in a industry also amplifies the
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impact of any exogenous capital structure determinant.
Theoretically, peer effects in capital structure can arise from a variety of mechanisms.
Several models are presented to account for mimicking behavior in capital structure. For ex-
ample, some models predict that firms are motivated to mimic the more conservative leverage
policies of their peers, either because high leverage invites predatory price competition from
less-levered rivals (Bolton and Scharfstein 1990) or because high-leverage firms under-invest
during industry downturn and loss market shares to more conservatively financed competi-
tors (Chevalier and Scharfstein 1996). Additionally, rational herding models (Devenow and
Welch 1996) are also used to explain mimicking. Informational factors may play a big role.
Free-riding in information acquisition or relative performance evaluation for managers may
lead to herd behavior in capital structure policies (Zeckhauser, Patel, and Hendricks 1991).
When a firm’s own signal is noisy and optimization is costly, managers may rationally put
more weight on the decision of other firms in the industry that are perceived as having
greater expertise (Banerjee 1992, Conlisk 1980, Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch 1998).
In addition, learning mechanisms may be at work. Managers need not completely ignore
their own information. Rather, it is sufficient that they update their priors in a Bayesian
manner based on the observed actions of other firms (Romer 1993 and Trueman 1994). As a
result, their decision will be pulled toward those of their peers, relative to what it would be
if they solely relied on their own information. Reputation is another explanatory factor for
mimicking, as managers may mimic other firms’ policies to influence their perceived quality
in the labor market (Scharfstein and Stein 1990 and Zwiebel 1995). Empirically, Leary and
Roberts 2014 find that smaller and more financial constrained firms are more sensitive to
the financial choices of their peers, suggesting that mimicking behavior is strongest among
those firms with the greatest learning motive and the greatest need to build reputation.
However, most of the existing models only serve to explain converging financial choices
among peer firms. Moreover, the general equilibrium implications of such responses to
peer actions are also unclear. The model in this paper presents a mechanism derived from
Robichek and Myers 1966 through which the financial choices of peer firms enter a firm’s
strategic consideration without assuming mimicking behavior. Rather, it explores the chan-
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nel of peer influence through how liquidation values in times of financial distress might be
affected by peer choices of leverage level. Strategic responses to peer debt choices generate
optimal debt levels at Nash equilibrium.
Shleifer and Vishny 1992 presents a general equilibrium model that explores the economy-
and industry-wide determinants of asset illiquidity. When a firm in financial distress needs
to sell assets, its industry peers are likely to be experiencing problems themselves, leading to
asset sales at prices below value in best use. Such asset illiquidity makes assets cheap in bad
times, and so ex ante is a cost of leverage. As a result, optimal debt levels are restricted by
asset illiquidity (e.g. cyclical and growth assets have a lower optimal level of debt finance)
and dependent on the leverage of other firms in the same industry. Moreover, this model
suggests that the debt choices of the firms in the same industry could be very divergent
instead of mimicking each other. While each individual firm can have a high or a low debt
level depending on which equilibrium obtains, there is an aggregate industry-level optimal
debt capacity.
Base on such understandings of the impact of asset illiquidity on optimal debt choices,
the model in this paper considers a two-period two-firm game. Each strategically chooses
a debt level in time 0 in response to expected utility of time 1, which is a function of its
cash flow and expected cost of financial distress, which is further influenced by peer choices
of liquidation. The next section introduces the benchmark model, while following sections
explore its implications and consider further variations to the basic model.
2.1 The Model
2.1.1 The Benchmark Model (no peer effects)
The model has two periods, 0 and 1. For simplicity, assume zero interest rate. There are two
firms in the industry, F and F ′, which are completely symmetrical. The capital structure of
each is determined in period 0 by choosing a debt level, D and D′, which bring immediate
tax benefits of τD and τD′. In period 1, each firm realizes a cash flow, V and V ′, which are
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i.i.d U [0, 1]. The distribution of each other’s cash flow is common knowledge in period 0; in
period 1, the uncertainty of a firm’s own cash flow is resolved, but they still don’t know the
realized cash flow of the opponent.
In period 1, if a firm’s realized cash flow is above its debt level, i.e. V ≥ D, then
the firm faces no financial distress and its value is V + τD. The firm will face financial
distress if V < D, in which case it has two options, continuation or liquidation. If the firm
chooses to continue, it will incur a cost of φ(D − V ). In this case, the firm’s value would
be V − φ(D − V ) + τD. In the case of liquidation, the firm liquidates its assets for a price
of P and leaves with a total value of P + τD. Notice that this baseline model does not yet
contain peer effects on liquidation values; therefore, a firm’s optimal debt level is not yet
affected its peer’s debt choice.
Firm F ’s objective is to choose an optimal debt level D in period 0 to maximize its
expected value in period 1. The same holds for firm F ′. The solution is straightforward.
We can conclude that a firm will continue for ∀ V ≥ Λ and liquidate for ∀ V < Λ, where
Λ = P+φD
1+φ
< D. So in period 0, a firm’s expected utility can be written as
U(D) =
∫ Λ
0
PdV +
∫ D
Λ
(V − φ(V −D))dV +
∫ 1
D
V dV + τD (2.1)
As a result, the optimal debt level for both firms is D∗ = P + (1 + φ)/φτ .
2.1.2 Introducing Peer Effects on Liquidation Prices
Now we can introduce peer effects on liquidation prices to the baseline model. According
to Shleifer and Vishny 1992, asset illiquidity is exacerbated when firms experience economy-
or industry-wide shocks. In bad times, when more firms in the same industry experience
difficulties and may be forced to liquidate their assets, liquidation prices will plummet not
only because of more distressed assets are being offered for sale but also because industry
insiders, who would be the highest valuation buyers in normal times, are likely to have cash
flow problems of their own and thus constrained in their purchasing capacity, leading to fire
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sales of the assets to inefficient industry outsiders at prices much below value in best use.
Based on this understanding, in our model let’s suppose that the liquidation price of a
firm’s assets is Ph when only one firm is liquidating and Pl when both firms are liquidating,
where Ph > Pl.
In period 1, firms play a one shot game by choosing whether to liquidate. Let the function
L(V,D,D′) represents firm F ’s liquidation choice. L equals 1 if firm F chooses to liquidate,
equals 0 if it chooses to continue. Similarly, L′ represents the liquidation choice of firm F ′.
Consider the liquidation choice of firm F . It will liquidate (i.e. L = 1 ) if and only if the
expected utility of liquidation is greater than the expected utility of continuation:
E[Pl × L′ + Ph × (1− L′)]− [V − φ(D − V )] > 0 (2.2)
In period 0, firm F chooses its debt policy D(D′) so that given the opponent’s debt
choice D′, D(D′) maximizes its expected utility in period 1. Since the two firms are perfectly
symmetrical, the same conditions apply for firm F ′.
Lemma 1 There exists a single cutoff of the cash flow Vc, above which the firm will choose
to continue, and below which the firm will choose to liquidate.
Proof 1 Consider Equation 2.2. Since the cash flow V is i.i.d., so the first part, which can
be written as E[Ph−(Ph−Pl)×L′], is independent of V . And the second part [V −φ(D−V )]
is strictly continuously increasing w.r.t. V (linear function). Therefore, the whole left-hand-
side expression is a strictly decreasing linear function w.r.t. V . Thus, if there exists a V˜
that makes the left-hand-side expression negative, then ∀V > V˜ the expression should be
negative. If V˜ makes this expression positive, then ∀V < V˜ the expression should be positive.
Furthermore, when V = 0 the expression is positive and when V = D it is negative. Hence,
∃Vc ∈ [0, D] such that when V = Vc the expression equals 0. Then, ∀V > Vc the firm will
choose to continue, and ∀V < Vc the firm will choose to liquidate.
The next step is to solve the response function D(D′) and the optimal equilibrium. Since
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two firms are symmetrical, their Vc should be the same given debt choices. We can get Vc as
a function of D, D′, φ, Ph, and Pl:
Vc = A ·D +B ·D′ + C
A =
φ · (1 + φ)
(1 + φ)2 − (Ph − Pl)2 > 0
B =
−φ · (Ph − Pl)
(1 + φ)2 − (Ph − Pl)2 < 0
C =
Ph
1 + φ+ Ph − Pl > 0
(2.3)
This result is very intuitive. The cutoff Vc increases w.r.t. D and decreases w.r.t. D
′. A
higher D means higher costs in financial distress, hence the firm is more likely to liquidate
even under a higher cash flow, hence the higher Vc. A higher D
′ means the opponent firm
is more likely to liquidate, which lowers the expected utility of the liquidation option, thus
the firm will be less likely to liquidate, hence the lower Vc.
Then we can solve for the optimal debt level:
D∗ =
β
1− α
α = −−A
2(Ph − Pl)−B2(Ph − Pl)− (1 + φ)A ·B + φB
2[−A ·B(Ph − Pl) + 1+φ2 (1− A2)− φ(1− A)− 12 ]
β = −−A · C(Ph − Pl) + A · Pl −B · C(Ph − Pl)− (1 + φ)A · C + φC + τ
2[−A ·B(Ph − Pl) + 1+φ2 (1− A2)− φ(1− A)− 12 ]
(2.4)
From now on this will be our baseline peer-effect model.
2.2 Properties of the Baseline Peer-Effect Model
1. Optimal debt level increases with tax benefit.
As shown in figure 2.1, the optimal debt level D∗ increases with the tax benefit of debt
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τ , which is consistent with classical theories of capital structure.
0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
D
Ph = 0.4, Pl = 0.2
 = 0.65
 = 0.7
 = 0.75
 = 0.8
 = 0.85
 = 0.9
Figure 2.1: Optimal Debt vs. Tax Benefit
2. Optimal debt vs. peer effects on liquidation prices
Peer effects on liquidation prices can be captured by the difference between Ph and Pl.
The following two scenarios discuss the dynamic between D∗ and the difference of the
two liquidation prices.
(a) Scenario 1. Fix Ph, vary the rate of Pl/Ph.
This is the more intuitive approach. According to Shleifer and Vishny 1992’s
theory about the determinants of asset illiquidity, when a firm is liquidating due
to idiosyncratic factors (e.g. mismanagement), it is more likely that other firms
in the industry will compete to drive the asset price in liquidation up to the
fundamental value in best use. By contrast, during an industry-wide recession,
more firms experience financial distress and are forced to liquidate, liquidation
prices tend to be much depressed below value in best use when assets are forced
to be sold to less efficient industry outsiders.
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Figure 2.2: Optimal Debt and Price Discount (Ph fixed)
Corresponding to our mode, Ph can be interpreted as being more approximate to
value in best use, while Pl as the depressed liquidation price in recession. Hence, a
lower ratio of Pl/Ph represents a higher extent to which simultaneous liquidations
in the same industry (often due to industry-wide negative shocks to cash flow)
distort the liquidation prices below value of best use due to asset illiquidity. Figure
2.2 shows that given a level of Ph and φ (the rate of financial distress cost if the
firm chooses to continue), the optimal debt level D∗ decreases with a lower Pl/Ph.
This means that as the discount of liquidation price becomes more severe when
both firms choose to liquidate, the optimal level of firm leverage is lowered because
of the worsened asset illiquidity.
(b) Scenario 2. Fix Ph + Pl, vary the spread of Ph − Pl. In other words, Ph can be
written as mean+ spread, Pl = mean− spread, where mean is fixed.
If we don’t think of liquidation as depressed sales of firm assets that tend to
be at prices lower than value of best use to varying degrees, but as transactions
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conforming more to normal supply-demand relations, we may capture the price
response to supply by following set-up. Suppose there is a mean value the repre-
sents the assets’ value of best use. When only one firm is liquidating, the price Ph
is higher than the mean value because of supply scarcity. When both firms are
liquidating, the price Pl is lower than the mean value because of over supply. In
other words, a bigger spread (Ph − Pl) around the mean represents higher price
elasticity to changes in supply.
Figure 2.3 shows the dynamic between optimal debt level D∗ and the price spread
around a fixed mean. That is, Ph + Pl is fixed at 0.7, while Ph − Pl varies.
Interestingly, this result seems to be the opposite of that in scenario 1. When the
mean is fixed, a bigger price spread between Ph and Pl leads to a higher optimal
debt level. How do we interpret this result? The key is that under this setting, not
only is liquidation price negatively affected by more firms choosing to liquidate,
it is also positively affected by fewer firms choose to liquidate. Whenever the
probability of the opponent firm choosing to continue under financial distress
(Prob, indicated by the upward tilting red line in Figure 2.3) is strictly higher
than 0.5, the original firm’s expected liquidation price Prob×Ph+(1−Prob)×Pl
is increasing w.r.t. the price spread Ph−Pl. As a result, when the mean is fixed, a
bigger price spread means a higher expected liquidation price, and consequently a
higher optimal debt level. Following this logic, when the probability of continuing
falls below 0.5, the relationship between D∗ and Ph−Pl will be reversed. However,
that situation is much rarer.
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Figure 2.3: Optimal Debt and Price Spread (Ph + Pl fixed)
2.3 Variation: Adding Different Firm Sizes
Up till now the two firms in the baseline model are entirely symmetrical. Now we can add in
the variation that two firms are not of the same size. Suppose firm F is the larger one, with
its scale being 1 and its cash flow V ∼ U [0, 1]. F ′ is the smaller firm, with its scale being
Γ and its cash flow V ′ ∼ U [0,Γ]. How does the optimal leverage ratio of each firm (now
defined as the absolute optimal debt amount scaled by firm size: D∗ and D′∗/Γ) change in
response to the varying size difference between the two firms?
Figure 2.4 shows the result. As the size difference between the two firms enlarges (Γ
decreases), the optimal leverage ratio for the larger firm goes down while that of the smaller
firm goes up from the common D∗ when the two firms are symmetrical. The bigger the
difference in firm size, the more their optimal leverage ratios diverge.
How do we interpret this result? Apparently, this is contrary to the predictions of learning
and reputation models that smaller firms are more likely to mimic the capital structure of
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Figure 2.4: Optimal Debt and Firm Size
industry leaders. Rather, Shleifer and Vishny 1992 has considered a situation where firms
have divergent optimal leverage, while the industry as a whole has a more or less stable
overall debt capacity. My finding corresponds to an equilibrium where the smaller firm has
a lot of debt and is liquidated in the depression, while the bigger firm, in recognition that
there is an opportunity to buy the liquidating firm in the depression, chooses to forgo the
debt overhang just to take this opportunity. In turn, the fact that the bigger firm has little
debt and is more likely to continue in period 1 makes it attractive for the smaller firm to
have more debt.
2.4 Variation: Adding Correlation in Cash Flow
It is natural to assume that firms in the same industry should receive positively correlated
cash flows. Not only would this correlation affect firms’ debt choices through the channel
of correlated liquidation, its effect also work through the channel of information, as higher
correlation means that firms can better infer each other’s cash flow based on their own
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outcome. Correlated cash flows can be introduced to the baseline model by the following
transformation:
 X1
X2
 ,
 Φ−1(V1)
Φ−1(V2)
 ∼ N
 0
0
 ,
 1 ρ
ρ 1
 (2.5)
Where Φ(·) is the CDF of standard normal distribution. X1 and X2 are jointly normally
distributed. In period 1, firm 1 will receive a cash flow of V1 = Φ(X1) and firm 2 will get
V2 = Φ(X2). The distributions of Xi and Vi are common knowledge in period 0. Notice that
the marginal distribution of Vi is still a standard uniform distribution on [0, 1]. When ρ = 0,
this model converges to the baseline model; and when ρ = 1, both firms receive the same
amount of cash flow. Basically, by introducing Xi, this transformation imposes a normal
copula on the joint distribution of the two firms’ cash flows. Correlated cash flows also mean
that one’s own cash flow now contains information about the opponent’s cash flow. Notice
that while Xi ∼ N(0, 1), X−i|Xi ∼ N(ρXi, 1 − ρ2). So in period 1, firms now have more
accurate information about each other’s cash flow based on their own realized cash flow.
It is worth noting that this information effect of cash flow correlation means that there
are now possibly multiple equilibrium with regard to the firms’ choices of liquidation. For
an extreme example, assume ρ = 1, meaning that two firms receive the exact same cash flow
in period 1. So both firms know precisely each other’s cash flow once its own cash flow is
realized. For the parameter setting of φ|D1−D2| < Ph−Pl and WOLOG assume D1 > D2,
for Pl+φD1
1+φ
< ∀V < Ph+φD2
1+φ
, both the continuation values of firm 1 and firm 2 will be between
Pl and Ph, because Pl < V − φ(D1 − V ) < V − φ(D2 − V ) < Ph. In this case, either of
the firm has the incentive to liquidate, but not both. Hence there are two equilibria: firm
1 liquidates and firm 2 continues, or firm 1 continues and firm 2 liquidates. For now we
assume that the firm with higher debt will liquidate.
Another complexity is that multiple cutoff points of Vc also become a possibility. Recall
the firm’s liquidation choice expression in equation 2.2. Again the [V −φ(D−V )] is increasing
w.r.t. V . Now in case of a positive correlation between the cash flows, the first term
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E[Ph− (Ph−Pl)×L′] is no longer independent of V but also becomes increasing w.r.t V . As
a result, the argument of a single cutoff point of Vc in lemma 1 is not applicable anymore.
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Figure 2.5: Responses to Peer Debt with Varying ρ
Setting aside these extreme cases, let’s now look at how different levels of correlation affect
the optimal debt levels under the assumption of single equilibrium and single cutoff point.
As shown in Figure 2.5, with a higher correlation ρ, the response function of D(D′) becomes
more steep around equilibrium points. The equilibrium optimal debt level, as indicated by
the crossing point of the response function and the 45 degree diagonal line, increases with
the correlation level ρ.
Intuitively, one might expect that a higher level of cash flow correlation should be asso-
ciated with a lower optimal debt level, since higher correlation implies higher possibility of
both firms facing financial distress and liquidating. However, Figure 2.5 apparently shows
the opposite, that the equilibrium of both firms’ optimal debt level increases with the cor-
relation of their cash flows. The reason behind this phenomenon is that the two firms are
locked in a situation similar to the prisoner’s dilemma. When ρ increases, the probability of
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both firms liquidating increases while the probability of only one firm liquidating decreases.
From either firm’s perspective, itself being the liquidating firm when the opponent chooses
to continue is definitely a better case scenario than a situation where both firms choose to
liquidate. If the strategy and debt level of firm 2 remain unchanged, firm 1 has the incentive
to marginally increase its own debt level to increase the probability of the situation where
itself is the only firm to liquidate. The same rationale applies to firm 2. As a result, when
ρ increases, the equilibrium debt levels of both firms increase, which increases the risk of
industry-wide financial distress and simultaneous liquidations. The implication is alarming.
It means that in those industries where peer firms’ performance are more influenced by com-
mon factors (business cycle, supply shock, etc.), there is a tendency for the whole industry
to be overly leveraged. Highly correlated sectors are more susceptible to the risk of industry-
wide crises to begin with, which, unfortunately, is not remedied but further exacerbated by
their debt choices.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper has presented a theoretical model to explore how peer effects on liquidation prices
influence firms’ debt choices. The model predicts that optimal debt levels will be lower if
asset liquidation prices are expected to be more severely impacted by simultaneous peer
liquidations. Somewhat counter-intuitively, higher correlation in firms’ cash flows will lead
to higher debt levels in equilibrium. Individual firms’ attempts to maximize their own utility
lead to an industry-wide over leverage, further exacerbating the risk of general crises in an al-
ready highly correlated industry. This result cautions us against the presumption that firms’
capital structure choices can ameliorate industry-level risks. In certain situations, optimal
choices at the individual firm level only worsen the industry-level exposure to systematic
risks.
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Appendix : The Benchmark Model (No Peer Effect)
The firm’s expected utility can be written as the following.
U(D) =
∫ Λ
0
PdV +
∫ D
Λ
(V − φ(V −D))dV +
∫ 1
D
V dV + τD
= PΛ + 1/2(1 + φ)(D2 − Λ2)− φD(D − Λ) + 1/2(1−D2) + τD
And Λ = P+φD
1+φ
, Then
U(D) = D2
−φ
2(1 + φ)
+D(τ +
φPD
1 + φ
) + const
D∗ = −τ +
φPD
1+φ
2 −φ
2(1+φ)
= P +
1 + φ
φ
τ
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Appendix : Baseline Peer-Effect Model
Lemma 1 states that there exists a cutoff for V for each firm. So it must be true that when
V = V c the firm is indifferent between liquidation and continuation. That is
 E[Pl × L′ + Ph × (1− L′)|V = Vc]− [Vc − φ(D − Vc)] = 0E[Pl × L+ Ph × (1− L)|V ′ = V ′c ]− [V ′c − φ(D′ − V ′c )] = 0
Given the cutoff setup, we have
 E[L′|V = Vc] = P[V ′ < V ′c |V = Vc] = P [V ′ < V ′c ] = V ′cE[L|V ′ = V ′c ] = P[V < Vc|V ′ = V ′c ] = P [V < Vc] = Vc
Then  Ph − (Ph − Pl)× V ′c − [Vc − φ(D − Vc)] = 0Ph − (Ph − Pl)× Vc − [V ′c − φ(D′ − V ′c )] = 0
This is a linear equation set and after solving for Vc and V
′
c we have
Vc = A ·D +B ·D′ + C
V ′c = A ·D′ +B ·D + C
A = φ·(1+φ)
(1+φ)2−(Ph−Pl)2 > 0
B = −φ·(Ph−Pl)
(1+φ)2−(Ph−Pl)2 < 0
C = Ph
1+φ+Ph−Pl > 0
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Then firm’s expected utility becomes
U(D) =
∫ Vc
0
[PlV
′
c + Pl(1− V ′c )]dV +
∫ D
Vc
(V − φ(V −D))dV +
∫ 1
D
V dV + τD
= [PlV
′
c + Ph(1− V ′c )]Vc + 1/2(1 + φ)(D2 − V 2c )− φD(D − Vc) + 1/2(1−D2) + τD
= [Ph − (Ph − Pl)(AD′ +BD + C)](AD +BD′ + C) + 1/2(1 + φ)(D2 − (AD +BD′ + C)2)
− φD(D − (AD +BD′ + C)) + 1/2(1−D2) + τD
= D2((Ph − Pl)AB + 1/2(1 + φ)(1− A2)− φ(1− A)− 1/2)
+ D(D′(−(Ph − Pl)(A2 +B2)− (1 + φ)AB + φB)
+ (PhA− (Ph − Pl)(BC + AC)− (1 + φ)AC + φC + τ)) + const
This is quadratic w.r.t. D. So the response function can be written as
D(D′) = αD′ + β
D′(D) = αD + β
α = −−A
2(Ph − Pl)−B2(Ph − Pl)− (1 + φ)A ·B + φB
2[−A ·B(Ph − Pl) + 1+φ2 (1− A2)− φ(1− A)− 12 ]
β = −−A · C(Ph − Pl) + A · Pl −B · C(Ph − Pl)− (1 + φ)A · C + φC + τ
2[−A ·B(Ph − Pl) + 1+φ2 (1− A2)− φ(1− A)− 12 ]
So in equilibrium it must be true that D∗ = αD∗ + β. Hence D∗ = β/(1− α)
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Appendix : Model with Different Firm Sizes
Lemma 1 is still valid in this case. To solve a more general case, let’s assume the size of the
larger firm is ΓH while the size of the smaller firm is ΓL. In my model ΓH = 1 and ΓL = Γ.
 E[Pl × L′ + Ph × (1− L′)|V = Vc]− [Vc − φ(D − Vc)] = 0E[Pl × L+ Ph × (1− L)|V ′ = V ′c ]− [V ′c − φ(D′ − V ′c )] = 0
Given the cutoff setup, we have
 E[L′|V = Vc] = P[V ′ < V ′c |V = Vc] = P [V ′ < V ′c ] = V ′c/ΓLE[L|V ′ = V ′c ] = P[V < Vc|V ′ = V ′c ] = P [V < Vc] = Vc/ΓH
Then
 Ph − (Ph − Pl)× V ′c/ΓL − [Vc − φ(D − Vc)] = 0Ph − (Ph − Pl)× Vc/ΓH − [V ′c − φ(D′ − V ′c )] = 0
This is a linear equation set and after solving for Vc and V
′
c we have
Vc = AH ·D +BH ·D′ + CH
V ′c = AL ·D′ +BL ·D + CL
AH = AL =
φ · (1 + φ)
(1 + φ)2 − (Ph − Pl)2/ΓH/ΓL > 0
BH =
−φ · (Ph − Pl)/ΓL
(1 + φ)2 − (Ph − Pl)2/ΓH/ΓL < 0
BL =
−φ · (Ph − Pl)/ΓH
(1 + φ)2 − (Ph − Pl)2/ΓH/ΓL < 0
CH =
Ph(1− (Ph − Pl)/ΓL/φ)
(1 + φ)2 − (Ph − Pl)2/ΓH/ΓL > 0
CL =
Ph(1− (Ph − Pl)/ΓH/φ)
(1 + φ)2 − (Ph − Pl)2/ΓH/ΓL > 0
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Now the expected utility for firm Fbecomes
U(D) =
∫ Vc
0
[PlV
′
c/ΓL + Pl(1− V ′c/ΓL)]
dV
ΓH
+
∫ D
Vc
(V − φ(V −D))dV
ΓH
+
∫ ΓH
D
V
dV
ΓH
+ τD
= [PlV
′
c/ΓL + Ph(1− V ′c/ΓL)]Vc/ΓH + 1/2(1 + φ)(D2 − V 2c )/ΓH
− φD(D − Vc)/ΓH + 1/2(Γ2H −D2)/ΓH + τD
= [Ph − (Ph − Pl)(ALD′ +BLD + CL)/ΓL](AHD +BHD′ + CH)/ΓH
+ 1/2(1 + φ)(D2 − (AHD +BHD′ + CH)2)/ΓH
− φD(D − (AHD +BHD′ + CH))/ΓH + 1/2(Γ2H −D2))/ΓH + τD
= D2(
(Ph − Pl)AHBL
ΓHΓL
+ 1/2(1 + φ)(1− A2H)/ΓH − φ(1− AH)/ΓH − 1/2/ΓH)
+ D(D′(
−(Ph − Pl)(AHAL +BHBL)
ΓHΓL
− (1 + φ)AHBH/ΓH + φBH/ΓH)
+ (PhAH/ΓH − (Ph − Pl)(BLCH + AHCL)
ΓHΓL
− (1 + φ)AHCH/ΓH + φCH/ΓH + τ))
+ const
Similarly the expected utility for firm F’ is
U ′(D′) =
∫ V ′c
0
[PlVc/ΓH + Pl(1− Vc/ΓH)]dV
ΓL
+
∫ D′
V ′c
(V − φ(V −D′))dV
ΓL
+
∫ ′ΓL
D
V
dV
ΓL
+ τD′
= [PlVc/ΓH + Ph(1− Vc/ΓH)]V ′c/ΓL + 1/2(1 + φ)(D′2 − V ′2c )/ΓL
− φD′(D′ − V ′c )/ΓL + 1/2(Γ2L −D′2)/ΓL + τD′
= [Ph − (Ph − Pl)(AHD +BHD′ + CH)/ΓH ](ALD′ +BLD + CL)/ΓL
+ 1/2(1 + φ)(D′2 − (ALD′ +BLD + CL)2)/ΓL
− φD′(D′ − (ALD′ +BLD′ + CL))/ΓL + 1/2(Γ2L −D′2))/ΓL + τD′
= D′2(
(Ph − Pl)ALBH
ΓHΓL
+ 1/2(1 + φ)(1− A2L)/ΓL − φ(1− AL)/ΓL − 1/2/ΓL)
+ D′(D(
−(Ph − Pl)(AHAL +BHBL)
ΓHΓL
− (1 + φ)ALBL/ΓL + φBL/ΓL)
+ (PhAL/ΓL − (Ph − Pl)(BHCL + ALCH)
ΓHΓL
− (1 + φ)ALCL/ΓL + φCL/ΓL + τ))
+ const
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Hence
D(D′) = αHD′ + βH
D′(D) = αLD + βL
αH = −
−(Ph−Pl)(AHAL+BHBL)
ΓHΓL
− (1 + φ)AHBH/ΓH + φBH/ΓH
2[ (Ph−Pl)AHBL
ΓHΓL
+ 1/2(1 + φ)(1− A2H)/ΓH − φ(1− AH)/ΓH − 1/2/ΓH ]
αL = −
−(Ph−Pl)(AHAL+BHBL)
ΓHΓL
− (1 + φ)ALBL/ΓL + φBL/ΓL
2[ (Ph−Pl)ALBH
ΓHΓL
+ 1/2(1 + φ)(1− A2L)/ΓL − φ(1− AL)/ΓL − 1/2/ΓL]
βH = −
PhAH/ΓH − (Ph − Pl) (BLCH+AHCL)ΓHΓL − (1 + φ)AHCH/ΓH + φCH/ΓH + τ
2[( (Ph−Pl)AHBL
ΓHΓL
+ 1/2(1 + φ)(1− A2H)/ΓH − φ(1− AH)/ΓH − 1/2/ΓH)]
βL = −
PhAL/ΓL − (Ph − Pl) (BHCL+ALCH)ΓHΓL − (1 + φ)ALCL/ΓL + φCL/ΓL + τ
2[ (Ph−Pl)ALBH
ΓHΓL
+ 1/2(1 + φ)(1− A2L)/ΓL − φ(1− AL)/ΓL − 1/2/ΓL]
After solving for D = D(D′(D)) , the result is
D∗ =
αHβL + βH
1− αHαL
D′∗ =
αLβH + βL
1− αHαL
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CHAPTER 3
Applying Deep Learning to Momentum Trading
Strategies
The financial literature on the cross-section prediction of stock returns is voluminous. Price
momentum and reversals have been documented for various time horizons. Bondt and Thaler
1985 document long-term reversals over a period of 3 to 5 years while Lehmann 1990 and
Jegadeesh 1990 document reversals for horizons of one-week and one-month, respectively.
Over the horizons of 3 to 12 months, return continuation (momentum) is observed (Jegadeesh
and Titman 1993, 2001). Examining returns in weekly frequencies, Gutierrez Jr and Kelley
2008 also find reversals in short horizons and momentum in the 3-to-12 month horizons,
which have gradually become a widely accepted wisdom.
The cross-section return predictability exists between and within industries (Moskowitz
and Grinblatt 1999; Hameed and Mian 2015) and, beyond the US market, appears to be
prevalent in many other markets to varying degrees (Rouwenhorst 1998; Muga and Santa-
mara 2007; Naughton, Truong, and Veeraraghavan 2008; Hhn and Scholz 2019; Tang and
Zhang 2014). Prevalence of momentum or reversal is found to be associated with many fac-
tors, including firm characteristics such as market cap and volatility (Wei and Yang 2012),
past trading volume (Connolly and Stivers 2003), and liquidity provision by active institu-
tional investors (Cheng et al. 2017).
The existence of momentum and reversal effects provides a possible ground for construct-
ing profitable trading strategies. In reality, however, it turns out to be challenging to transfer
research outputs into real-world investment trading, as the findings of existing studies tend
to be contingent on specific market periods and holding horizons. The momentum/reversal
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trading strategies are largely the products of a vast effort by finance academics and practi-
tioners to hand-engineer features from historical stock prices.
With the recent development in deep learning, historical financial prices can be a fertile
ground to test if machine learning algorithms can generate more reliable trading strategies
than the traditional statistical methods used in financial research and practice. In general,
deep learning refers to a rich set of neural network models that show promising results in
improving the prediction accuracy of regression and classification problems in many different
areas of scientific research such as image processing, speech recognition, etc (Goodfellow,
Bengio, and Courville 2016).
The idea of applying deep learning models to financial predictions is not entirely new.
Trippi and DeSieno 1992 have experimented with trading equity index futures with a neural
network. Leung, Daouk, and Chen 2000 also used neural networks as part of a forecast-
ing model for stock indices. These early works are prone to the problem of over-fitting
and as a result haven’t generated much impact in the financial literature. More recently,
Takeuchi 2013 have analyzed cross-sectional momentum strategies using a restricted Boltz-
mann machine, which shows performance improvements compared to classical counterparts.
Dixon, Klabjan, and Bang 2017 have applied deep learning to predict the returns of cur-
rency and commodity futures based on high-frequency data. Messmer 2017 has trained deep
Deep Feedforward Networks with firm characteristics to predict the US cross-section of stock
returns and found that the model-generated long-short portfolios can outperform a linear
benchmark. Li and Tam 2018 have experimented with various machine learning techniques
to predict the momentum and reversal effects in the stock market of mainland China and
highlighted the promising use of machine learning approaches to build real-world profitable
trading strategies.
This study aims to further explore how recent innovations in deep learning can enhance
momentum- and reversal-based trading strategies. I have designed a Deep Feedforward
Network (DFN) to look at prediction changes purely from variations in the input data of
historical prices. To capture the momentum and reversal effects in all the possible short-
and mid-horizons documented in the literature, for any stock i’s performance in month m,
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twenty z-scored returns accumulated over horizons of 1 to 10 days and 1 to 10 months are
fed to the deep learning machine as predictive variables. The model is trained to generate
a predictive signal for each stock that ranges from 0 to 1, where a higher value indicating a
higher probability that the said stock will outperform the market median in the next period.
Once the model has finished learning from the training data set, which covers the period
from 1965-2000, it is tested on the validation set (2000-2016). Based on the ranking of
the model-generated predictive signals, I then construct a long-short portfolio with the top
and bottom 20, 30, or 40 percentiles of the stocks. These portfolios generated by the deep
learning machine significantly outperform traditional momentum strategies by both mean
returns and Sharpe ratios. Over the course of the 15-year validation period, the long-short
portfolio using the top and bottom quintiles would have performed the best, seeing a total
value increase of 50 times, in comparison to a 2.5 times increase of the S&P500 portfolio
over the same period.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3
sets up and trains the Deep Feedforward Neutral Network Model. In Section 4, I report the
results of applying the trained model to the validation set and try to explore the factors
behind the better performance of deep-learning-generated portfolios over traditional trading
strategies. Section 5 concludes.
3.1 Data Description
The stock price data is obtained from The Center for Research in Security Price (CRSP). I
restrict my analysis to US shares trading on NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq (with exchange codes
of 1, 2 or 3). PERMNO is used as the stock identifier. Stock prices are adjusted by dividing
a cumulative price adjusting factor to account for stock split or dividend. Data for the
Fama-French five factors, momentum factor, and short-term reversal factor are downloaded
from Kenneth French’s website. The price data is split into two sets by date. Data from the
beginning of 1965 to the end of 2000 is used as the training set, and data from the beginning
of 2000 to the end of 2016 is used for validation.
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To construct the training data set, for any stock i’s return in month m, the dependent
variable is defined as a binary that takes the value of 1 if the stock’s return is higher than
the cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. On the predictive side, twenty z-scores are
constructed cross-sectionally from the preceding window of 12 months:
• First, with the starting moment of the window fixed at one year before the current
trading month m, compute the z-scored return accumulated over a horizon of 1 to
10 months. This generates 10 scores, respectively for a 1-month horizon (m − 12), a
2-month horizon (m − 12 to m − 11), a 3-month horizon (m − 12 to m − 10), and so
forth, until a 10-month horizon (m− 12 to m− 2).
• Second, from the first day d in month m−1, compute the z-scored return accumulated
over a horizon of 1 to 10 days. This generates another 10 scores, respectively for a
1-day horizon (d), a 2-day horizon (d to d + 1), a 3-day horizon (d to d + 3), and so
forth, until a 10-day horizon (d to d + 10). So the ’cooling period’ of this strategy is
around 20 days, from d+ 11 to the end of month m− 1.
To deal with missing and invalid data, entries with no value for the dependent variable
or more than four missing values for independent variables are dropped. The remaining
missing points in the independent variables are back-filled with the mean value of all the
valid independent variables within the same window. The window then rolls forward by a
month and the process above is repeated. The entries from different windows are vertically
stacked to form the training data set, which includes in total 1, 783, 402 entries.
For the validation data set, the predictive variables for each stock i in month m are
constructed in the exact same way. There are 189 months in the validation data set. The
predictive variables are sent into the model, which returns a predictive signal between 0 and
1, indicating the machined-predicted likelihood for stock i to outperform the cross-sectional
median in month m. The outcome in reality, i.e. stock i’s actual return in month m, is used
to evaluate the hypothetical performance of the investment portfolios that are constructed
according to the machine-generated signals.
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3.2 Model
3.2.1 Deep Feedforward Network
Figure 3.1: Example of a Simple Four-Layer (6-4-4-1) DFN
For the architecture of the deep learning model, I have chosen the Deep Feedforward
Networks (DFNs), also known as feedforward neural networks or multilayer perceptrons
(MLPs). The basic mechanism of a DFN model works as follows. The goal of a DFN is to
approximate some function y = G∗(x). In the case of this study, G∗(x) is a classifier function
that maps a stock’s historical performance x to a binary output y of whether its return in the
current month is above the cross-sectional median. The DFN defines a mapping y = G(x,θ)
and learns the value of the model parameters θ that result in the best approximation.
To do the approximation, the model consists of multiple layers. The input data enters
into the input layer. The number of notes in the input layer equals to the dimension of
the independent variable; in our case, that is 20. Then they go through a series of hidden
layers that connect various inputs in a nested and hidden structure. The output layer reflects
the prediction target. Figure 3.1 illustrates a simple four-layer (6-4-4-1) DFN. The model
architecture used in this study is a five-layer (20-50-100-20-2) fully connected DFN, which is
shown in Fig 3.2, where the input layer (with 20 nodes) is at the bottom, the output layer
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(with 2 nodes) at the top, and three hidden layers in between.
Figure 3.2: Five-Layer (20-50-100-20-2) DFN Model Specification.
Between two adjacent layers, any node i in the upper layer is fully connected with any
node j in the lower layer by an edge with weight wij. Node i in the upper layer has a value
of vi = f(
∑
j ujwij + bi), where uj is the value of the jth node in the lower layer, and bi
is a node-specific bias term. The f function is called an activation function. Usually it’s
”S” shaped. Examples of activation functions are logistic function f(z) = 1
1+e−z , arctangent
function f(z) = arctan(z), step function f(z) = sgn(z), etc. In our five-layer model, the
activation function for layers 2, 3, 4 is a rectifier function:
f(z) = z+ = max(0, z) (3.1)
For a classification problem, the top layer contains as many nodes as the number of
classes. There are two classes for the model used here: stock performance either higher or
lower than the median. Hence there are two nodes in the top layer. The value of each node
indicates the probability that the input data ends up in that node. So we need a way to
make sure that the value of each node is between 0 and 1 and their values add up to 1.
Let yi be the the value of node i in the output layer (i = 0, 1). Therefore, y1 represents
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the predicted probability that the stock will outperform the median, while y0 is the predicted
probability that it will perform below the median. yi is calculated by a softmax classifier as
follows:
yi = σi(z0, z1) =
ezi
ez0 + ez1
for i = 0, 1 (3.2)
in which
zi =
∑
j
ujwij + bi for i = 0, 1 (3.3)
where uj is the value of node j in the layer below (i.e. layer 4), and bi is the bias term
specific to node i.
One can easily verify that y0 and y1 are between 0 and 1 and add up to 1. With the
two being equivalent, y1 is the only output variable that we need to look at. The softmax
classifier has the additional advantage that it works well with the cross-entropy loss function,
which will be detailed in the next part.
The model output that we are interested in, which is the predicted probability of the a
stock outperforming the cross-sectional median, can be expressed as
y = G(x,θ) = g(4)(g(3)(g(2)(g(1)(x)))) (3.4)
Where g(n) is the transformation between the layer n− 1 and layer n. With the training
data set, the deep learning machine then tries to generate the model parameters θ, which
includes all the edge weights and node-specific bias terms, to best predict the outcome.
3.2.2 Cost Function
To train the model, an objective function, also called a cost function, needs to be defined.
Here I use the loss function of maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). In the case of classi-
fication, the loss function of MLE,
∑
log(P[D|X; θ]), becomes
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C = − 1
N
∑
d∈D
(y∗dln(yd) + (1− y∗d)ln(1− yd)) (3.5)
where D is the whole training dataset, d is an element in the set, N is the number
of elements in the dataset, y∗d is the actual binary outcome for d, and yd is the predicted
probabilistic outcome.
The training process is to find the edge weights and node-specific biases that minimize
the cross-entropy given a certain dataset. Since the model is very complicated and non-
linear, it’s hard to acquire analytical solutions to these parameters like in a linear regression.
Luckily, the gradient of the loss function can be directly acquired, given each node’s value,
by back-propagation, which is an application of the chain-rule when calculating derivatives.
3.2.3 Gradient Descent, Stochastic Gradient Descent, and Mini-Batching
Gradient descent is a iterative tool for finding the minimum of a function. Each iteration
the optimization is done by moving along the gradient by one step. Fig 3.3 shows the basic
idea of gradient descent. The circled blue lines are the contour plot of the loss function.
Gradients are perpendicular to the blue lines. To find the local minimum, we start at point
x0, and calculate the gradient of the loss function at x0. Then move along the gradient for
one step from x0 to x1. Then at x1, calculate the local gradient, move along it to x2, and so
on. Eventually we should reach to a point where it’s close to the local minimum.
The downside of a “full” gradient descent in machine learning is that for each iteration,
the gradient has to be recalculated, by using the full dataset. So when the dataset is
considerably large, this method becomes very slow. The solution to this problem is to
split data into plenty of “mini-batches.” In each iteration, the optimizer uses one batch
to calculate the gradient and move a step,which hugely speeds up the training process. I
reshuﬄe the whole dataset and re-batch for certain iterations. In my code, I used a learning
rate of 0.005, reshuﬄed 150 times, and the batch size is 1000.
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Figure 3.3: Illustration of Gradient Descent
3.2.4 Validation
Once the training is finished and the model parameters are generated, I apply the model to
the validation data set, which includes the twenty input variables constructed from the period
2000 to 2016. The model’s outputs are monthly predicted signals for each stock indicating its
probability of performing above the cross-sectional median from March 2001 onward. Based
on the predicted signals, I construct an investment portfolio by longing stocks with signals
in the top x percentile and shorting stocks with signals in the bottom x percentile. The
portfolio is re-balanced every month. The stocks are equal-weighted. The monthly return
of the long-short portfolio from March 2001 to November 2016 (189 months in total) can be
computed with the actual stock returns in the validation period.
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Table 3.1: Annualized Returns of Different Strategies
Portfolio Mean Stdev Sharpe Ratio
ML 40 0.17 0.135 1.53
ML 30 0.206 0.158 1.31
ML 20 0.267 0.175 1.25
MOM 40 0.109 0.135 0.8
MOM 30 0.131 0.158 0.83
MOM 20 0.167 0.186 0.9
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Portfolio Returns
Table 3.1 shows the portfolio returns throughout the span of 189 months. Returns are an-
nualized as well as the Sharpe Ratio. ML 40, ML 30, and ML 20 represent the long-short
portfolios created by the deep learning signals with the top and bottom 40, 30, and 20 per-
centiles of the stocks, respectively. In addition, I have also created benchmark portfolios for
comparison using a simple momentum strategy. MOM 40, MOM 30, and MOM 20 repre-
sent, respectively, the long-short portfolios that include the top and bottom 40, 30, and 20
percentiles of stocks based on their returns in the preceding 12 months.
Overall, we can see that the portfolios generated by the deep learning machine outperform
the simple momentum strategies by both mean returns and Sharpe ratios. ML 20, ML 30,
ML 40 achieve annualized returns of 0.267, 0.206, and 0.17 respectively. The back-tested
Sharpe ratios are 1.25, 1.31, and 1.53 respectively. Since the signals are the same across
different portfolios in the ML category, the difference is only the number of stocks they pick
up. ML 20 takes in a smaller number of stocks, therefore it has a higher return but also
suffers from higher volatility. As a result, the Sharpe ratio is lower for the ML 20 strategy.
Figure 3.4 shows the progression of portfolio values over time. “sprtrn” is a portfolio
invested in the S&P 500 index. All portfolio values start at 1. Over the course of fifteen
years, the ML 20 portfolio performed the best. ML 20, ML 30, and ML 40 would have
grown by about 50 times, 20 times and 10 times respectively, in comparison to the S&P 500
portfolio that has increased by 2.5 times over the same period.
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Figure 3.4: Portfolio Value of Different Strategies (2001-2016)
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Figure 3.5: Relative Importance of the Twenty Input Scores
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Which of the twenty input scores fed into the deep learning machine turn out to be
most relevant for the prediction? Figure 3.5 shows the relative importance of the twenty
input scores. Recall that input variables 1 to 10 represent the z-scored returns accumulated
over 1 to 10 months starting from m − 12; input variables 11 to 20 represent the z-scored
returns accumulated over 1 to 10 days starting from the first day of the previous month.
The color of each square (i, j) in Figure 3.5 represents the portfolio return of ML 30 when
input variables i and j are masked. When i = j, it represents the portfolio return when only
input variable i is masked. The figure is symmetrical along the negative-sloping diagonal
line. The benchmark return of ML 30, when no input is masked, is 20.6%. The darker the
square color, the lower the portfolio return.
Input variable 10, which is the 10-month accumulated return from m−12 to m−2, seems
to exert the greatest impact on the model prediction when it is masked together some other
input variables. The highest impact comes from the simultaneous masking of input 10 and
input 5, which is the 5-month accumulated return from m−12 to m−7, and the simultaneous
masking of input 10 and input 16, which is the 6-day accumulated return starting from the
first day of the previous month.
3.3.2 Factor Analysis
To better understand the characteristics of the composition of the machine-generated portfo-
lios, I run the portfolio returns against known factors that explain variations in stock/portfolio
prices.
Table 3.2 shows the results of regressing the monthly portfolio returns of ML 20, ML 30,
and ML 40 on the Fama-French three factors plus a momentum or reversal factor (Fama
and French 1993). Returns are monthly and not annualized. Rm − Rf is the excess return
of the value-weight market portfolio over the risk-free return. SMB is the return on a
diversified portfolio of small stocks minus the return on a diversified portfolio of big stocks.
HML is the difference between the returns on diversified portfolios of high and low book-
to-market ratio stocks. Mom, the momentum factor, is the difference between returns on
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Table 3.2: Portfolio Returns vs. FF Three Factors, Momentum, and Short-Term Reversal
Intercept Rm-Rf SMB HML Mom ST Rev R2
ML 40 0.015∗∗∗ −0.348∗∗∗ −0.324∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗ 0.73
(1.62e-18) (1.35e-14) (7.11e-07) (1.31e-03) (3.74e-25)
ML 30 0.0183∗∗∗ −0.399∗∗∗ −0.36∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.71
(5.77e-19) (1.08e-13) (3.76e-06) (1.37e-03) (3.84e-24)
ML 20 0.0235∗∗∗ −0.467∗∗∗ −0.335∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗ 0.478
(3.01e-15) (1.87e-09) (3.26e-03) (1.01e-03) (7.14e-08)
ML 40 0.0168∗∗∗ −0.549∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗∗ 0.103 -0.099 0.513
(2.54e-14) (3.11e-20) (1.59e-03) (0.193) (0.136)
ML 30 0.0204∗∗∗ −0.63∗∗∗ −0.297∗∗∗ 0.126 -0.117 0.498
(7.39e-15) (1.7e-19) (3.24e-03) (0.18) (0.138)
ML 20 0.0251∗∗∗ −0.577∗∗∗ −0.269∗∗ 0.269∗∗ −0.281∗∗∗
(1.38e-15) (6.11e-13) (2.49e-02) (1.72e-02) (3.16e-03)
diversified portfolios of high and low accumulated returns over ten months from m − 12 to
m−2. ST Rev, the short-term reversal factor, is the difference between returns on diversified
portfolios of low and high accumulated returns over the prior month m− 1.
The coefficients on the momentum factor (Mom) are of the highest scale and strongly
significant, making it the top explanatory factor for the deep learning strategy. The mo-
mentum factor is also much more significant than the short-term reversal factor, indicating
the neural network has picked up a strategy that is more momentum-reliant, which is also
confirmed by the larger R2 for Mom. It also makes sense that ML 30 has the highest mo-
mentum coefficient since the break points in constructing the momentum factor are the 30th
and 70th percentile. The market (Rm −Rf ) and size (SMB) factors carry significant nega-
tive coefficients. Book-to-market ratio (HML) has positive coefficients, especially significant
when the momentum factor is added instead of the short-term reversal factor.
Taken together, it means that the deep learning strategies, to varying degrees, are in effect
longing the high-momentum portfolio, the big-cap portfolio, and the high book-to-market
portfolio, while shorting the market portfolio. Apparently, these factors do not capture all
variation in expected returns for the deep learning portfolios, all three of which have positive
and significant alphas. ML 40, ML 30, and ML 20 generate monthly alphas of 1.5, 1.8, and
2.3 percent points respectively, which are all significant at the 0.001 level.
65
Table 3.3: Portfolio Returns vs. Fama-French Five-Factor Model
Item Intercept Rm-Rf SMB HML RMW CWA
ML 40 0.012∗∗∗ −0.33∗∗∗ −0.156∗∗ -0.068 0.839∗∗∗ 0.174
(1.79e-10) (6.26e-10) (3.34e-02) (0.389) (2.07e-15) (0.134)
ML 30 0.015∗∗∗ −0.378∗∗∗ −0.162∗ -0.066 0.986∗∗∗ 0.175
(4.59e-11) (2.16e-09) (6.22e-02) (0.481) (3.427e-15) (0.204)
ML 20 0.0189∗∗∗ −0.318∗∗∗ -0.109 0.111 1.2∗∗∗ 2.179e-04
(p-value) (1.06e-11) (2.07e-05) (0.299) (0.326) (2.14e-15) (0.999)
Alternatively, Table 3.3 shows the result of using the Fama-French Five-Factor model to
explain the monthly portfolio returns (Fama and French 2015). In addition to the original
three factors of Rm −Rf , SMB, and HML, the five-factor model adds two more factors to
capture operational profitability and investment. RMW is the difference between the returns
on diversified portfolios of firms with robust and weak operational profitability. CWA is the
difference between the returns on diversified portfolios of firms with low and high investment.
The Five-Factor Model has better prediction powers than the three factors plus mo-
mentum. The intercepts in Table 3.3 are smaller than those in Table 3.2, but still very
significant statistically and economically. The coefficients shown in Table 3.3 suggest that
the most prominent factor captured by the deep learning strategies is RMW . Operating
profitability is measured with accounting data as revenue minus cost of goods sold, minus
selling, general, and administrative expenses, minus interest expense on all divided by book
equity. The coefficient for RMW is close to 1 for the ML 30 and varies from 0.84 for ML 40
to 1.2 for ML 20, all at extremely high levels of significance.
To test if operating profitability is indeed a differentiating factor in the deep learning
portfolios, we can compare the statistics of the longed stocks and the shorted stocks. Figure
3.6 shows the trend of the average operating profitability of the stocks that are longed in
ML 30 vs. those that are shorted. The t-test confirms that the difference is extremely
significant.
It seems that the deep learning portfolios, which are constructed purely based on inputs
of momentum/reversal information, resemble to a great extent portfolios that long firms with
robust profitability and short those with weak profitability. It suggests important connections
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Figure 3.6: Average Operating Profitability in Long and Short Portfolios
between the predictability of stock prices and firm profitability. Indeed, the RMW factor
has a correlation coefficient of 0.46 with the momentum factor. A recent article by Liang,
Tang, and Xu 2019 also takes notice of the correlation between momentum and profitability
factors and points to uncertainty as a possible common source. More research needs to be
done in the future to fully explore the mechanism of such connections.
In addition to operating profitability, market (Rm − Rf ) and size (SMB) still carry
significant negative coefficients, same as in Table 3.2. The conservativeness/aggressiveness
of firm investment (CWA) is not a significant factor, nor is book-to-market ratio (HML)
anymore. The insignificance of HML is in line with Fama and French’s observation that the
addition of RMW and CWA to the factor model tends to absorb the explanatory power of
HML, making it a redundant factor.
3.4 Conclusion
This study has explored the potential of using deep learning models to predict equity prices
and generate profitable trading portfolios. I have designed a Deep Feedforward Network
(DFN) to predict a stock’s likelihood of performing over the cross-sectional median purely
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from variations in the input data of historical prices. Rolling Z-scored cumulative returns of
various horizons are fed to the model as predicative variables. With the model parameters
generated by the training dataset, the model is applied to the validation set to generate
a monthly predicative signal for each stock. Based on this model-predicted signal, I have
constructed long-short investment portfolios out of the validation dataset.
The deep learning portfolios yield an annualized return of over 20 percent and outperform
simple momentum strategies. The most important input variable for the deep learning model
seems to be the 10-month accumulative return from m-12 to m-2, especially in combination
with the 5-month accumulative return from m-12 to m-7 or the 6-day accumulative return
starting from the first day of the previous month.
When regressed on commonly used factor models, the characteristics of the deep learning
portfolios can be approached. Operating profitability seems to be the most prominent factor
underlying the machine-generated strategies. It seems that the deep learning portfolios,
which are constructed purely based on inputs of historical price information, resemble to a
great extent portfolios that long firms with robust profitability and short those with weak
profitability. Future research can further explore the connection between price predictability
and profitability factors. Of lesser importance than operating profitability are the factors of
market, size, momentum, and, to an even smaller degree, book-to-market ratio. The deep
learning strategies, to varying degrees, are in effect longing the high-momentum portfolio,
the big-cap portfolio, and the high book-to-market portfolio, while shorting the market
portfolio. Still, even after accounting for these common factors, the deep learning portfolios
still generate significantly large alphas. In general, the paper concludes with the great
potential of using machine learning methods for portfolio management and asset pricing
research.
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